# 1NC

### 1NC – Kritik

The 1AC’s Orthodox IR’s atomistic approach to global problems makes extinction inevitable

* Discourse uses a selection bias and is seen in a historical context that makes seem true – this causes a global reaction and trend towards violence
* Orthodox IR fails to solve the problems of the 1AC because they re-create the drive for security and the order that already exists
* Their vision of international relations believes that violence can be a rational decision sometimes which is not the case – this allows for acceptance which makes violence possible
* Their solutions only address the symptoms not the root causes of violence which means they can never solve – only continue the harm
* EVEN IF their crisis scenarios are true it is still a reason to vote negative – it proves the current order founded on their IR theory is unsustainable – try or die for moving away
* Securitization forces a militarized response to solutions that could be solved by other means – this neglects social justice and is a positive peace disad

Ahmed 12 Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society" Global Change, Peace & Security Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011 Taylor Francis 3. From securitisation to militarisation 3.1 Complicity

This analysis thus calls for a broader approach to environmental security based on retrieving the manner in which political actors construct discourses of 'scarcity' in response to ecological, energy and economic crises (critical security studies) in the context of the historically-specific socio-political and geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted, and which are often implicated in the acceleration of these very crises (historical sociology and historical materialism). Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour, conflictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in which it is embedded. They are, in other words, unable to address the relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics. Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale - in the very process of seeking security.85 In Cox's words, because positivist IR theory 'does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it'.86 Orthodox IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason -thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence. Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises. By the same token, the incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing social, political and economic structures are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the proliferation of symptom-led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military-political power rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes.88 It is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nullified under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency to 'securitise' them - and this, ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conflict and militarisation responsible for magnified global insecurity. 'Securitisation' refers to a 'speech act' - an act of labelling - whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of 'security', therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper 'dual' structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military-police measures in purported response to an existential danger. The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating 'new security challenges', and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that remains to examine is on the 'surface' of the international system (geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on), phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms. Indeed, orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to 'new security challenges' such as 'low-intensity' intra-state conflicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation; international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafficking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism.91 Although the majority of such 'new security challenges' are non-military in origin - whether their referents are states or individuals - the inadequacy of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily examined through the lenses of military-political power.92 In other words, the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring urgent transformation, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military-political capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on.93 Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed (given that state power itself is constituted by these structures) deserve protection. This justifies the state's adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations - rationalising violence toward them as a control mechanism. Consequently, for the most part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as potential 'threat-multipliers' of traditional security issues such as 'political instability around the world, the collapse of governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens'. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources. The US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a 'stress-multiplier' that will 'exacerbate tensions' and 'complicate American foreign policy'; while the EU perceives it as a 'threat-multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability'.95 In practice, this generates an excessive preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, but with their purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them by controlling problematic populations. Paradoxically, this 'securitisation' of global crises does not render us safer. Instead, by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting preventive action, it guarantees greater insecurity. Thus, a recent US Department of Defense report explores the future of international conflict up to 2050. It warns of 'resource competition induced by growing populations and expanding economies', particularly due to a projected 'youth bulge' in the South, which 'will consume ever increasing amounts of food, water and energy'. This will prompt a 'return to traditional security threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for depleting natural resources and overseas markets'. Finally, climate change will 'compound' these stressors by generating humanitarian crises, population migrations and other complex emergencies.96 A similar study by the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of ‘the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents’, the report concludes that ‘The implications for future conflict are ominous.’97 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: ‘In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s’, 95 per cent accruing to developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. ‘Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conflict.’98 The assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conflict due to their rapidly growing populations. A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable ‘youth bulge’ by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to ‘endemic unemployment’ will be channelled through ‘political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces’. More strangely, predicting an intensifying global divide between a super-rich elite, the middle classes and an urban under-class, the report warns: ‘The world’s middle classes might unite, using access to knowledge, resources and skills to shape transnational processes in their own class interest.’99 Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrate how secur-itisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarization against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order. In other words, the internal reductionism, fragmentation and compartmentalisation that plagues orthodox theory and policy reproduces precisely these characteristics by externalising global crises from one another, externalising states from one another, externalising the inter-state system from its biophysical environment, and externalising new social groups as dangerous 'outsiders\*. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of state militarisation and the construction of new "outsider\* identities is insufficient to understand the causal dynamics driving the process of 'Otherisation'. As Doug Stokes points out, the Western state preoccupation with the ongoing military struggle against international terrorism reveals an underlying 'discursive complex", where representations about terrorism and non-Western populations are premised on 'the construction of stark boundaries\* that 'operate to exclude and include\*. Yet these exclusionary discourses are 'intimately bound up with political and economic processes', such as strategic interests in proliferating military bases in the Middle East, economic interests in control of oil, and the wider political goal of 'maintaining American hegemony\* by dominating a resource-rich region critical for global capitalism.100 But even this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of certain hegemonic discourses is mutually constituted by these geopolitical, strategic and economic interests — exclusionary discourses are politically constituted. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of which destroys the other on the basis of a preeminence in bureaucratic military-political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different. As Hinton observes, genocides precisely constitute a process of 'othering\* in which an imagined community becomes reshaped so that previously 'included\* groups become 'ideologically recast' and dehumanised as threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious, political or economic lines — eventually legitimising their annihilation.102 In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and 'Otherised' in accordance with a specific socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and classifying particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of 'inclusion\*, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible.1 3 This recalls Lemkin's recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally connected with a wider socio-political project - or colonial project — designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives can the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable. Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary social group construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated sociopolitical crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms; and which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new 'outsider' group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions. It is in this context that various forms of mass violence, which may or may not eventually culminate in actual genocide, can become legitimised as contributing to the resolution of crises.105

Reject the affirmatives securitized discourse – rejection of securitized rhetoric is necessary to foster change

* Deconstruction of epistemology is a prior question – elites have created the current world order which shapes our knowledge production, discourse, and understanding of the world – because all actions depend on our understanding it must be correct for other actions to be considered correct – this makes alt solvency irrelevant because we will never know the truth until we reject their vision of the world
* Citizen Action is important at the level of the speech act – even if it doesn’t create a movement calling out bad discourse can prevent it in the future
* No inevitability claims – the US didn’t always securitize and there is not a reason it needs to if people change
* The state fails – it militarizes all solutions and will co-opt the alternative empirical historical examples prove
* Alt solves – the red scare, and the withdrawl of Vietnam shows how grassroots pressure can force action

LAL 08, (Prerna P. Lal, J.D. in law, freelance writer, “Deconstructing the National Security State: Towards a New Framework of Analysis,” POSC 4910: Senior Seminar, <http://prernalal.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/css-deconstructing-the-nat-sec-state.pdf> , KENTUCKY)

Critical theory does not offer simple one-shot solutions to the problems created by the neo-realist state and elitist conception of security. To give simple answers would be a performativity contradiction, especially after criticizing realism for being intellectually rigid for believing in objective truth. In other words, there are no alternatives; just alternative modes of understanding. However, using the poststructuralist Foucaultian analysis that discourse is power, we can move towards deconstructing the power of the state and elites to securitize using their own tool: discourse. The elites who control the meaning of security and define it in terms that are appropriate to their interests hold tremendous power in the national security state. As Foucault astutely observed, “the exercise of power is always deeply entwined with the production of knowledge and discourse” (Dalby 1998, 4). For too long, language has been used against us to create our reality, thereby obfuscating our lens of the world, depriving us from an objective search for truth and knowledge. The history of colonized people shows how the construction of language defined and justified their oppressed status. In a way, we are colonized through discursive practices and subjected to the reality that the state wants us to see. However, definitions belong to the definer, and it is high time that we questioned and defined our own reality. Thus, citizen action is critical to questioning and deconstructing the national security state and taking away its power to define our security. In On Security, Pearl Alice Marsh (1995, 126) advances the idea of a grassroots statecraft that is defined as “challenging foreign policy of government through contending discursive and speech acts.” This calls for pitting the values of civil society against the state establishment and challenging the American statecraft’s freedom to cast issues and events in a security or militarized framework. The United States has not always been a national security state and neither does it have to maintain that hegemonic and oppressive status in order to exist. It is critical to remember that fundamental changes in our institutions and structures of power do not occur from the top; they originate from the bottom. History is case in point. Citizen action was critical to ending the Red Scare and the Vietnam War, as the American people realized the ludicrousness of framing Vietnam as a security issue, which led to the fall of the Second New Deal, the deaths of thousands of American soldiers and a financial cost that we are still shouldering. In the end, what they need to be secured from and how, is a question best left up to individual Americans and subsequently, civil society. Thus, grassroots citizen action performatively makes individuals the referent subject of security as people would call for the demilitarization and desecuritization of issues that are contrary and irrelevant to human security. There is hope for the future and practical application of critical theory ininternational relations. As Robert Lipschutz (2000, 61) concludes in After Authority:War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century, “it was the existence of the Otheracross the border that gave national security its power and authority; it is thedisappearance of the border that has vanquished that power.” Britain, France andGermany set aside their historical enmities and became part of a European community,which has formed a new collective identity and security across borders. Cold War rivals that almost annihilated the world are now friends in the “war against terror.” The apartheid regime in South Africa did collapse eventually. In the past two years, India andPakistan have been moving towards a more peaceful future that also includes fighting the“war against terror” together. While nation-states that were previously hostile to eachother have united to be hostile towards other states, it is not overly idealist to suggest thatwith each new friendship and alliance, there is one less foe and one less Other. The world is not stable and stagnant, existing in an anarchic, nasty and brutish framework in which states have to endlessly bargain for their self-interest, as realists would like us to believe.On the contrary, international relations and the boundaries constructed by the state are subject to change and ever-transitioning, which presents a compelling case for critical theory as a more realistic framework through which we can view international relations.Therefore, our ultimate search for security does not lie in securing the state from the threat of the enemy across the border, but in removing the state as the referent object of security and moving towards human emancipation.

### 1NC – CP

#### Text: the United States federal government should remove the entirety of the economic embargo towards Cuba

**Solves the aff better – better for relations and credibility – removes more resources**

### 1NC – Politics

#### Syrian strikes will be authorized now – Obama has successfully brokered with republicans

AFP 9/3 [“Obama gets key Republican backing on Syria,” Capital News, http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2013/09/obama-gets-key-republican-backing-on-syria/]

WASHINGTON, Sep 3 – US President Barack Obama won strong backing from key Republican leaders Tuesday for military strikes against Syria, as Washington dramatically closed ranks to send a message to President Bashar al-Assad that chemical weapons must not be used.¶ The developments in Washington came as the UN refugee agency released grim new statistics about the more than two year old conflict, saying more than two million Syrians have now fled the violence.¶ Obama warned as he met key congressional leaders at the White House that Assad must pay a price for violating an international norm by unleashing what the US has said was sarin gas on a Damascus suburb last month.¶ The use of such weapons not only resulted in “grotesque deaths” but also risked falling into the hands of terror groups or “non state actors,” Obama warned.¶ “That poses a serious national security threat to the United States and to the region,” Obama said. “And as a consequence, Assad and Syria needs to be held accountable.”¶ Just over an hour later, John Boehner, the Republican speaker of the House of Representatives who has fought tooth and nail with Obama on domestic policy emerged from the West Wing with a firm endorsement of the president’s strategy.¶ “I am going to support the president’s call for action,” Boehner said.¶ “This is something that the United States as a country needs to do,” Boehner said, adding that he believed his colleagues should also support Obama’s request for authorization to use military force.¶ Moments later, another key Republican, House majority leader Eric Cantor, who is popular with the party’s conservative rank and file, also backed Obama’s stance.¶ “Assad’s Syria, a state sponsor of terrorism, is the epitome of a rogue state, and it has long posed a direct threat to American interests and to our partners,” Cantor said.¶ The House, as opposed to the Democratic led Senate, was seen as the tougher sell for Obama, after he put apparently imminent military strikes on hold on Saturday and decided to seek authorization from Congress.¶ While the backing of Republican leaders for strikes does not mean that lawmakers, weary of years of US wars abroad, will back military strikes, it substantially increases the odds of a yes vote, likely as soon as next week.¶ Assad, in a rare interview with Western media released on Monday, warned military strikes risked setting off a wider conflict in the Middle East.¶ “Everyone will lose control of the situation once the powder keg explodes. Chaos and extremism will spread. There is a risk of regional war,” Assad said.¶ More than 100,000 people have died since the rebellion to oust long time leader Assad erupted in March 2011.¶ The UN refugee agency Tuesday revealed that some two million Syrians have now fled the country, in a tide of humanity which is straining resources in neighboring countries. Millions more have also been displaced inside the country.¶ Antonio Guterres, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, described the figures as a “disgraceful humanitarian calamity with suffering and displacement unparalleled in recent history.”¶ The two million milestone which represents a nine fold increase in 12 months was not just an appalling statistic, but represents “two million individual stories. Two million people, many have lost their houses, members of their families, their possessions,” Guterres said.¶ On average, some 5,000 Syrians flee their country every day, the UNHCR says.¶ As part of the White House offensive to win over skeptical lawmakers, the US secretaries of state and defense were to appear before a Senate panel later Tuesday.¶ Amid the mounting anxiety, Israel and the United States launched a missile over the Mediterranean as part of a joint exercise.¶ However, the Pentagon said the test was not linked to any possible US military action against Syria.¶ “The test was long planned to help evaluate the Arrow Ballistic Missile Defense system’s ability to detect, track, and communicate information about a simulated threat to Israel,” Pentagon spokesman George Little said.¶ France, which backs Obama in his determination to launch a military intervention in Syria, Tuesday called on Europe to unite in its response to the crisis.¶ “When a chemical massacre takes place, when the world is informed of it, when the evidence is delivered, when the guilty parties are known, then there must be an answer,” French President Francois Hollande said.¶ “This answer is expected from the international community,” he said.¶ Paris Monday released an intelligence report which said Assad’s forces had carried out a “massive” chemical attack last month.¶ Based on military and foreign intelligence services, the report said the regime launched an attack “combining conventional means with the massive use of chemical agents” on rebel held areas near Damascus on August 21.¶ France has emerged as the main US ally in the Syria crisis after the British parliament last week rejected involvement in any military action.¶ British Prime Minister David Cameron is set to push Russia and others to back a diplomatic solution to the Syria conflict at the G20 in Saint Petersburg this week.

#### Plan costs capital

**Aho 13** (Matthew Aho, Inter-American Dialogue's Latin America Advisor, What Does Obama's Second Term Hold for U.S.-Cuba Relations?, <http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/newsroom?ContentRecord_id=2c202b27-1916-4509-b1b7-00d7ed8f4914>, 1/23/13)

Aside from easing some travel restrictions, there have been only two emergent themes on Cuba policy: support for private-sector efforts to increase the flow of information to the Cuban people; and support for private economic activity on the island. Cuba policy changes still require expenditures of political capital disproportionate to the island's strategic and economic importance. Barring game-changing developments—such as release of USAID subcontractor Alan Gross—executive action during Obama's second term will likely focus on furthering goals laid out during his first. Here, however, John Kerry's leadership could prove vital and create new opportunities for U.S. business.

#### Obama’s political capital is essential to authorization – he’s put all other issues aside

Politico 9/4 [CARRIE BUDOFF BROWN and JAKE SHERMAN, “President Obama’s political capital spreads thin,” 2013, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/obamas-political-capital-spreads-thin-96306.html]

President Barack Obama faced a heavy lift in Congress this fall when his agenda included only budget issues and immigration reform.¶ Now with Syria in the mix, the president appears ready to spend a lot of the political capital that he would have kept in reserve for his domestic priorities.¶ A resolution authorizing the use of force in Syria won’t make it through the House or the Senate without significant cajoling from the White House. That means Obama, who struggles to get Congress to follow his lead on almost everything, could burn his limited leverage convincing Democrats and Republicans to vote for an unpopular military operation that even the president says he could carry out with or without their approval.¶ “The only effect is — and I don’t mean this to be dismissive in any way — it will be taking up some time and there be some degree of political capital expended by all,” said Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), the Foreign Relations Committee ranking member who helped draft the Senate resolution. “At the end of the day, it’s a tough vote for anybody because the issue is trying to draft an authorization knowing that they’re going to implement it.”¶ The West Wing says it’s too early to know how Obama’s surprise decision to seek congressional authorization will affect the rest of his agenda, but his advisers are betting that a win could usher in other domestic successes.A failed vote, however, would undoubtedly weaken him.¶ A senior administration official said the effort could build some trust between the White House and Republicans that might ease tensions in negotiations over the budget and other issues.¶ White House aides have long argued that success begets success. Their latest test of that theory was the broad bipartisan Senate vote for comprehensive immigration reform bill, which was supposed to compel the House to act. So far, it has not — and House Republicans don’t think the Syria vote will be any different.¶ “The idea that passing the authorization for use of military force in Syria would give the administration more leverage in future political debates is absurd,” one senior GOP leadership aide said. “They are currently spending political capital they don’t have.”¶ No matter how it plays out, the sudden emergence of a fight over Syria presents both political and logistical challenges for Congress and the White House.¶ House Republicans were already grumbling about the prospect of several perilous votes this fall — first on raising the debt limit and extending government funding, then on a package of reforms to the immigration system. White House aides began hearing skepticism from Republican leaders that they could force a debt limit hike through the chamber and then press for passage of even a pared-back immigration bill.¶ Adding a vote on military intervention in Syria could create even more friction between the Obama administration and House Republicans, as lawmakers are being put in a position of potentially voting against their party leaders. House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) and Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-Va.) are backing Obama, but the vast majority of the conference appears to oppose the resolution, at least at this point.¶ And even before Syria took over the headlines, there was very little time on the congressional calendar to address those issues — as well as the confirmation of the yet-to-be-nominated Federal Reserve chairman.¶ As much as Obama likes to say the White House and Congress should “be able to walk and chew gum at the same time,” often they cannot.¶ Obama is expected to travel to Los Angeles next week to speak at the AFL-CIO convention and attend fundraisers, but the senior administration official didn’t rule out a schedule change if the president needs that time to personally lobby lawmakers.¶ On Capitol Hill, the Syria vote has altered the GOP leadership’s plan for the first phase of the fiscal wars.¶ The original plan was to use the nine congressional work days in September to pass the continuing resolution to keep the government open. Republican leadership huddled during the recess to devise a plan to deal with lawmakers who want to defund Obamacare as part of the government funding debate.¶ Now, the first week in session is going to be spent — at least in part — planning for a Syria resolution that might not come to the floor until late in the week. House Republicans will discuss Syria in a closed-door meeting Tuesday morning. And although GOP leaders are not formally convincing members to vote a certain way, they will keep a count to know if the resolution will pass.¶ Time won’t be wasted on Republicans crafting their own Syria measure— top House aides privately say they will take whatever the Senate passes and put it on the floor, considering that senior aides in both parties say it will be very difficult for the House to pass the resolution.¶ The practical impact of this timeline is that the government funding discussion would be compacted into the four days between Sept. 17 and 20. The House is scheduled to leave town Sept. 20 and return Sept. 30 — the day government funding runs dry

#### A failure to strike Syria wrecks Obama’s credibility and makes Iranian proliferation inevitable

Michael O’Hanlon, Director of Research, Foreign Policy; Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, 8/26 [“Long-Term Strategy Needed to End the War in Syria,” Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/08/26-syria-political-solution-ohanlon]

Although I believe that President Barack Obama has taken too long to offer meaningful help to the Syrian opposition over the past two years, a policy that has permitted President Bashar Assad to remain in power too long while it facilitated the rise of extremist insurgent groups, I also sympathize with the White House’s apparent reluctance to engage in that country’s terrible civil war, even at this juncture.¶ On balance, the United States should retaliate against the Syrian regime. Presidential credibility is on the line, given that last year Obama called the possible use of chemical weapons a “red line” — meaning that if Assad crossed the line, his action would require a fundamentally different kind of American response.¶ More important than Obama’s personal credibility is the need to re-establish deterrence, so that the Syrian regime does not conclude that it has a green light to use chemical weapons even more widely. Beyond Syria itself, there is the matter of Iran, where the U.S. president has also established a red line: The Iranian regime will not be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon.¶ While Iran’s nuclear program is hardly within the bounds we would like, even Iran’s previous leader, President Mahmoud Ahmadenejad, did not cross that red line — perhaps out of conviction that doing so would prompt American military action. If deterrence is working even partially in Iran, we cannot afford to squander it by allowing Obama’s words on other issues to be proved hollow.

#### Nuclear war

Edelman, distinguished fellow – Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, ‘11

(Eric S, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February)

The reports of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and the Commission on the Prevention Of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, as well as other analyses, have highlighted the risk that a nuclear-armed Iran could trigger additional nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, even if Israel does not declare its own nuclear arsenal. Notably, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates— all signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (npt)—have recently announced or initiated nuclear energy programs. Although some of these states have legitimate economic rationales for pursuing nuclear power and although the low-enriched fuel used for power reactors cannot be used in nuclear weapons, these moves have been widely interpreted as hedges against a nuclear-armed Iran. The npt does not bar states from developing the sensitive technology required to produce nuclear fuel on their own, that is, the capability to enrich natural uranium and separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. Yet enrichment and reprocessing can also be used to accumulate weapons-grade enriched uranium and plutonium—the very loophole that Iran has apparently exploited in pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. Developing nuclear weapons remains a slow, expensive, and di⁄cult process, even for states with considerable economic resources, and especially if other nations try to constrain aspiring nuclear states’ access to critical materials and technology. Without external support, it is unlikely that any of these aspirants could develop a nuclear weapons capability within a decade.

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also oªered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads eªectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several diªerent ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might oªer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the npt since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT.

n-player competition

Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multipolar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarinebased nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly,would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war.

### 1NC – Disad

#### Russian Economy will not collapse – stable now

Adomanis 8/27 – (2013, Mark Contributor for Forbes Magazine, http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2013/08/27/do-you-think-russias-economy-is-doomed-the-bond-market-doesnt-agree/) rss

Earlier this year I wrote [several articles](http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2013/01/07/why-russias-economy-isnt-going-to-collapse/) pushing back against some [particularly alarmist](http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/12/30/the-end-of-putinomics.html) interpretations of Russia’s economy. After predicting Russia’s imminent implosion no less than 6 or 7 different times over the past decade I’m genuinely amazed that Owen Matthews wasn’t a little more gunshy in saying that 2013 was definitely the year in which everything would come crashing down around the Kremlin’s ears, but you really do not need to search very long or hard to find people who are [extremely disdainful](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-20/is-russia-already-in-recession-.html) of Russia’s economic performance and of the “obliviousness” and general stupidity of its policy makers.¶ It’s true that Russia’s economy is [slowing down](http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2013/08/19/russias-economy-really-is-slowing-down-unemployment-ticked-up-in-q2-2013/) and its also true that the authorities [don’t have any easy choices](http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/26/us-russia-gdp-forecast-idUSBRE97P0C620130826): monetary easing will likely spark inflation, and the state’s ability to engage in fiscal pump-priming is highly constrained. Growth over the next few years will be decidedly sub-par when compared to the 2000 boom years and even to the modest 2010-12 bounce back from the Great Recession.¶ However, if Russia really was rapidly approaching an economic dead-end, if there was increasingly recognition that its model was not going to survive, you would expect to see the Russian government’s borrowing costs go up. Yes Russia’s stock of government debt is not particularly large (at only around 10% of GDP) but if the market came to an understanding that the economic situation was going to get a lot worse in the not too distant future then investors would demand higher returns. Demand for Russian debt would go down, and the interest rates on that debt would go up. Economics 101.¶ And that’s exactly what happened during the worst days of the 2008-09 crisis: Russia’s borrowing costs skyrocketed from around 7% to almost 11% because there were serious, and perfectly understandable, doubts about Russia’s ability to weather the economic storm.¶ Since the crisis ended, however, the interest rates on long-term Russian government securities haven’t done much – they’ve bounced around within a relatively narrow range and are at about the same level now that they were back in 2006. This would seem, to me at least, to reflect market expectations of business as usual: not overly-rapid economic growth, but certainly not some sort of spectacular collapse.¶ Is it possible that the bond market is wrong? Sure. It’s possible that the market is wrong just as it is possible that Putin will be overthrown before the end of the year or that I will win the lottery. Almost anything is possible. But it certainly does not seem likely that the bond market would be so studiously immune to a mounting economic catastrophe. What that chart says to me is that things will continue in pretty much same vein, and that there aren’t going to be any big changes one way or another.¶ Russia’s economy might not be performing particularly well at the moment, but there’s very little evidence that it’s going to come screeching to a halt. So if like many Westerners you’re eagerly waiting for Putin to be ousted by a crippling economic crisis, you’re going to be waiting for a long time.

#### Lifting the embargo decreases oil prices

**Cala, 13 –** (Andres Cala, author on energy security. July 7, 2011. “Drill, Cuba, Drill.” http://www.energytribune.com/8204/drill-cuba-drill#sthash.4mplZhlX.dpbs)//SDL

The US should be cheering, not just because any significant oil find will contribute directly and immediately to American energy security. Assuming lifting the embargo is still too politically risky (and it shouldn’t be), Congress should seize the imminent arrival of the rig, the Norwegian designed Scarabeo 9, to relax the embargo on the communist island to allow US energy companies to partake in Cuban exploration and production.¶ Forget the fact that being communist or anti-democratic is no deterrent to American energy industry elsewhere. The US already imports almost 10 percent of its oil from Cuba’s closest ally Venezuela. Should the US now also penalize all companies investing there, including American ones?¶ It makes no sense to thwart Cuban efforts to increase oil output perhaps in as little as three years, especially considering oil prices that will remain stubbornly high because demand growth is rising faster than supply growth.

#### Oil prices key to Russia’s economy – over half of government revenue

**Schuman, 12 –** (Michael Schuman, Associated Press Staff Writer for Times. July 5, 2012. “Why Vladimir Putin Needs Higher Oil Prices,” http://business.time.com/2012/07/05/why-vladimir-putin-needs-higher-oil-prices/)//SDL

But Vladimir Putin is not one of them. The economy that the Russian President has built not only runs on oil, but runs on oil priced extremely high. Falling oil prices means rising problems for Russia – both for the strength of its economic performance, and possibly, the strength of Putin himself.¶ Despite the fact that Russia has been labeled one of the world’s most promising emerging markets, often mentioned in the same breath as China and India, the Russian economy is actually quite different from the others. While India gains growth benefits from an expanding population, Russia, like much of Europe, is aging; while economists fret over China’s excessive dependence on investment, Russia badly needs more of it. Most of all, Russia is little more than an oil state in disguise. The country is the largest producer of oil in the world (yes, bigger even than Saudi Arabia), and Russia’s dependence on crude has been increasing. About a decade ago, oil and gas accounted for less than half of Russia’s exports; in recent years, that share has risen to two-thirds. Most of all, oil provides more than half of the federal government’s revenues.¶ What’s more, the economic model Putin has designed in Russia relies heavily not just on oil, but high oil prices. Oil lubricates the Russian economy by making possible the increases in government largesse that have fueled Russian consumption. Budget spending reached 23.6% of GDP in the first quarter of 2012, up from 15.2% four years earlier. What that means is Putin requires a higher oil price to meet his spending requirements today than he did just a few years ago.¶ Research firm Capital Economics figures that the government budget balanced at an oil price of $55 a barrel in 2008, but that now it balances at close to $120. Oil prices today have fallen far below that, with Brent near $100 and U.S. crude less than $90. The farther oil prices fall, the more pressure is placed on Putin’s budget, and the harder it is for him to keep spreading oil wealth to the greater population through the government. With a large swath of the populace angered by his re-election to the nation’s presidency in March, and protests erupting on the streets of Moscow, Putin can ill-afford a significant blow to the economy, or his ability to use government resources to firm up his popularity.

#### Russian economic decline causes nuclear war

**Filger 9** (Sheldon, Author – Huffington Post, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction”, <http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356>)

**In Russia**, historically, **economic** health **and** political **stability are intertwined** to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that **desperate personnel would** illicitly **sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations**. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

### 1NC – Disad

#### **Relations high – empirically partners – recent meeting proves**

Aljazeera 12 – Aljazeera News, (“Cuba seeks strong trade ties with China”, Article Written for Aljazeera, 7/7/12, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2012/07/2012775380851346.html>, AW)

Cuba has signed a series of economic agreements with China coinciding with a visit to Beijing by leader Raul Castro. The four-day visit, which began on Thursday, has offered Castro a first-hand look at Chinese economic reforms. The pacts inked on Thursday include a grant and interest-free loan to the Cuban government for economic and technological co-operation. They also inculde a credit line to support Cuban health care and other public services, but further details were not given. The signings followed talks in which Castro told Hu Jintao, China's president, that relations between the two nations were deepening and broadening. The trip is Castro's first to China since taking over from his brother in 2008. Cuba watchers have speculated he would study China's mix of socialism and market liberalisation of which he spoke approvingly during a 1997 visit. Asked what Cuba could learn, Liu Weimin, the foreign ministry spokesman, said China was eager to share its experiences. "We consider that mutual communications benefit helping countries adopt a suitable model for economic and social development depending on concrete local conditions," Liu told reporters at a briefing. Cuba is China's biggest commercial partner in the Caribbean. Beijing helped prop up the Cuban economy after the withdrawal of Russian aid in the 1990s. Bilateral trade totalled $1.8bn in 2010. Though both communist nations, China has opened broadly to private business and has thrived economically while Cuba remains largely poor.

#### Cuba trade reverses Chinese bilateral dominance

Luko 11 – (James – Served in Washington DC with the National Council For Soviet East European Research, the Smithsonian Institute and two years as an analyst with the Canadian Department of National Defence, “China's Moves on Cuba Need to Be Stopped”, 6/29, <http://www.nolanchart.com/article8774-chinas-moves-on-cuba-need-to-be-stopped.html>)

The Red Dragon takes another wide step of not only flexing its muscles in Asia, but now wishes to supplant Russias and (former USSRs) forward base presence 90 miles from the United States- CUBA. Cuba is China's biggest trade partner in the Caribbean region, while China is Cuba's second-largest trade partner after Venezuela. Over the past decade, bilateral trade increased from $440 million in 2001 to $1.83 billion in 2010. [1] In 2006 China and Cuba discussed offshore oil deals and now China's National Petroleum Corporation is a major player in Cuban infrastructure improvements. [ibid] In 2008, none other than China's President himself, Hu JinTao visited Cuba with a sweet package of loans, grants and trade deals. If Cuba becomes a 'client' state of China, it will be a source of leverage against America whenever the U.S. Pressures China on Tibet and Taiwan. Soon we will witness the newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of natural resources. In 2003 it was reported that Chinese personnel were operating at least TWO (2) intelligence signal sations in Cuba since at least 1999 ! [2] This month, June 2011, the Vice President of China made an important visit, extending more financial aid, interest-free, as well as related health projects to be paid for by China. A client state in the making ! [3] The best way to counter the Chinese in Cuba is to reverse Americas 50 year old, ineffective and obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba. The Chinese threat in Cuba should be the catalyst for the US to establish open and normalized relations, with economic incentives to re-Americanize Cuba, return of American investments and security agreements. Checking the Chinese move in Cuba early on is vital to preventing a strategic Chinese foothold 90 miles from Florida. Allowing China to replace Russia in Cuba would be a strategic disaster. China is dangling financial assistance and investments in order to establish a beachhead close to the shores of America. This is a counter-response to Americas continued military presence in Asia, continued support of Taiwan and recent increased American aid to the Philippines in its spat with China over sovereignty of the Spratly Islands. The Cuban people wish to return to the American fold and re-establish the traditional relationship with the Cuban anchor in Florida- namely the almost 900,000 Cubans living in Florida alone! [4]

#### Lack of US economic engagement spurs China’s growth.

Erikson & Chen ‘7 – (Daniel is a Senior Associate of US Policy at the Inter-American Dialogue. Janice is a degree candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. “China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 31:2, Summer 2007, pg. 71)

China’s economic engagement with Latin America responds to the requirements of a booming Chinese economy that has been growing at nearly 10 percent per year for the past quarter century. The economic figures are impressive: in the past six years, Chinese imports from Latin America have grown more than six-fold, at a pace of some 60 percent a year, to an estimated $60 billion in 2006. China has become a major consumer of food, mineral, and other primary products from Latin America, benefiting principally the commodity-producing countries of South America-par- ticularly Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Chile. Chinese investment in Latin America remains relatively small at some $6.5 billion through 2004, but that amount represents half of China's foreign investment overseas.9 China's Xinhua News agency reported that Chinese trade with the Caribbean ex- ceeded $2 billion in 2004, a 40 percent increase from the previous year.10 China has promised to increase its investments in Latin America to $100 billion by 2014, although government officials have since backed away from that pledge and several proposed investments are already showing signs of falling short in Brazil, Argentina, and elsewhere. For their part, Latin Americans are intrigued by the idea of China as a potential partner for trade and investment. As a rising superpower with- out a colonial or "imperialist" history in the Western Hemisphere, China is in many ways more politically attractive than either the United States or the European Union, especially for politicians confronted with constituen- cies that are increasingly anti-American and skeptical of Western inten- tions. 12 Nevertheless, most analysts recognize that Latin America's embrace of China-to the extent that this has actually occurred-is intimately linked to its perception of neglect and disinterest from the United States. Nervousness about Chinas rise runs deeper among the smaller economies such as those of Central America, which do not enjoy Brazil's or Argentina's abundance in export commodities and are inclined to view the competi- tion posed by the endless supply of cheap Chinese labor as a menace to their nascent manufacturing sectors. But even as China seeks to reassure the United States that its interests in South America are purely economic, Beijing has begun enlisting regional powers like Mexico to aid its effort to woo Central American diplomats. Pressure is also being placed on Paraguay by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, its partners in the South American Common Market (Mercosur), which places certain constraints on member states' bilateral foreign policy prerogatives. Despite its avowals to Washington, China appears to be using its economic might as a means to achieve the patently political objective of stripping Taiwan of its democratic allies in the Western Hemisphere.

#### Collapse causes social unrest – results in great power war

Kane 01 – [Thomas Kane, PhD in Security Studies from the University of Hull & Lawrence Serewicz, Autumn, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01autumn/Kane.htm>]

Despite China's problems with its food supply, the Chinese do not appear to be in danger of widespread starvation. Nevertheless, one cannot rule out the prospect entirely, especially if the earth's climate actually is getting warmer. The consequences of general famine in a country with over a billion people clearly would be catastrophic. The effects of oil shortages and industrial stagnation would be less lurid, but economic collapse would endanger China's political stability whether that collapse came with a bang or a whimper. PRC society has become dangerously fractured. As the coastal cities grow richer and more cosmopolitan while the rural inland provinces grow poorer, the political interests of the two regions become ever less compatible. Increasing the prospects for division yet further, Deng Xiaoping's administrative reforms have strengthened regional potentates at the expense of central authority. As Kent Calder observes, In part, this change [erosion of power at the center] is a conscious devolution, initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1991 to outflank conservative opponents of economic reforms in Beijing nomenclature. But devolution has fed on itself, spurred by the natural desire of local authorities in the affluent and increasingly powerful coastal provinces to appropriate more and more of the fruits of growth to themselves alone.[ 49] Other social and economic developments deepen the rifts in Chinese society. The one-child policy, for instance, is disrupting traditional family life, with unknowable consequences for Chinese mores and social cohesion.[ 50] As families resort to abortion or infanticide to ensure that their one child is a son, the population may come to include an unprecedented preponderance of young, single men. If common gender prejudices have any basis in fact, these males are unlikely to be a source of social stability. Under these circumstances, China is vulnerable to unrest of many kinds. Unemployment or severe hardship, not to mention actual starvation, could easily trigger popular uprisings. Provincial leaders might be tempted to secede, perhaps openly or perhaps by quietly ceasing to obey Beijing's directives. China's leaders, in turn, might adopt drastic measures to forestall such developments. If faced with internal strife, supporters of China's existing regime may return to a more overt form of communist dictatorship. The PRC has, after all, oscillated between experimentation and orthodoxy continually throughout its existence. Spectacular examples include Mao's Hundred Flowers campaign and the return to conventional Marxism-Leninism after the leftist experiments of the Cultural Revolution, but the process continued throughout the 1980s, when the Chinese referred to it as the "fang-shou cycle." (Fang means to loosen one's grip; shou means to tighten it.)[ 51] If order broke down, the Chinese would not be the only people to suffer. Civil unrest in the PRC would disrupt trade relationships, send refugees flowing across borders, and force outside powers to consider intervention. If different countries chose to intervene on different sides, China's struggle could lead to major war. In a less apocalyptic but still grim scenario, China's government might try to ward off its demise by attacking adjacent countries.

## Credibility

#### Single actions don’t change international perceptions

Fettweis, 8 (Christopher – professor of political science at Tulane, Credibility and the War on Terror, Political Science Quarterly, Winter)

Since Vietnam, scholars have been generally unable to identify cases in which high credibility helped the United States achieve its goals. The shortterm aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, did not include a string of Soviet reversals, or the kind of benign bandwagoning with the West that deterrence theorists would have expected. In fact, the perceived reversal in Cuba seemed to harden Soviet resolve. As the crisis was drawing to a close, Soviet diplomat Vasily Kuznetsov angrily told his counterpart, "You Americans will never be able to do this to us again."37 Kissinger commented in his memoirs that "the Soviet Union thereupon launched itself on a determined, systematic, and long-term program of expanding all categories of its military power .... The 1962 Cuban crisis was thus a historic turning point-but not for the reason some Americans complacently supposed."38 The reassertion of the credibility of the United States, which was done at the brink of nuclear war, had few long-lasting benefits. The Soviets seemed to learn the wrong lesson. There is actually scant evidence that other states ever learn the right lessons. Cold War history contains little reason to believe that the credibility of the superpowers had very much effect on their ability to influence others. Over the last decade, a series of major scholarly studies have cast further doubt upon the fundamental assumption of interdependence across foreign policy actions. Employing methods borrowed from social psychology rather than the economics-based models commonly employed by deterrence theorists, Jonathan Mercer argued that threats are far more independent than is commonly believed and, therefore, that reputations are not likely to be formed on the basis of individual actions.39 While policymakers may feel that their decisions send messages about their basic dispositions to others, most of the evidence from social psychology suggests otherwise. Groups tend to interpret the actions of their rivals as situational, dependent upon the constraints of place and time. Therefore, they are not likely to form lasting impressions of irresolution from single, independent events. Mercer argued that the interdependence assumption had been accepted on faith, and rarely put to a coherent test; when it was, it almost inevitably failed.40

#### Relaxing sanctions on Cuba will kill US credibility

Rubin 11 – writer for the Washington Post, (Jennifer, Obama’s Cuba appeasement, Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/post/obamas-cuba-appeasement/2011/03/29/gIQAjuL2tL_blog.html>)

The administration’s conduct is all the more galling given the behavior of the Castro regime. Our willingness to relax sanctions was not greeted with goodwill gestures, let alone systemic reforms. To the contrary, this was the setting for Gross’s imprisonment. So naturally the administration orders up more of the same. Throughout his tenure, President Obama has failed to comprehend the cost-benefit analysis that despotic regimes undertake. He has offered armfuls of goodies and promised quietude on human rights; the despots’ behavior has worsened. There is simply no downside for rogue regimes to take their shots at the United States. Whether it is Cuba or Iran, the administration reverts to “engagement” mode when its engagement efforts are met with aggression and/or domestic oppression. Try to murder a diplomat on U.S. soil? We’ll sit down and chat. Grab an American contractor and try him in a kangaroo court? We’ll trade prisoners and talk about relaxing more sanctions. Invade Georgia, imprison political opponents and interfere with attempts to restart the peace process? We’ll put the screws on our democratic ally to get you into World Trade Organization. The response of these thuggish regimes is entirely predictable and, from their perspective, completely logical. What is inexplicable is the Obama administration’s willingness to throw gifts to tyrants in the expectation they will reciprocate in kind.

#### No impact to credibility – no abandoning or exploitation

Walt 11 (Stephen, Professor of International Relations – Harvard University, “Does the U.S. still need to reassure its allies?” Foreign Policy, 12-5, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/05/us\_credibility\_is\_not\_our\_problem)

A perennial preoccupation of U.S. diplomacy has been the perceived need to reassure allies of our reliability. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. leaders worried that any loss of credibility might cause dominoes to fall, lead key allies to "bandwagon" with the Soviet Union, or result in some form of "Finlandization." Such concerns justified fighting so-called "credibility wars" (including Vietnam), where the main concern was not the direct stakes of the contest but rather the need to retain a reputation for resolve and capability. Similar fears also led the United States to deploy thousands of nuclear weapons in Europe, as a supposed counter to Soviet missiles targeted against our NATO allies. The possibility that key allies would abandon us was almost always exaggerated, but U.S. leaders remain overly sensitive to the possibility. So Vice President Joe Biden has been out on the road this past week, telling various U.S. allies that "the United States isn't going anywhere." (He wasn't suggesting we're stuck in a rut, of course, but saying that the imminent withdrawal from Iraq doesn't mean a retreat to isolationism or anything like that.) There's nothing really wrong with offering up this sort of comforting rhetoric, but I've never really understood why USS.S. leaders were so worried about the credibility of our commitments to others. For starters, given our remarkably secure geopolitical position, whether U.S. pledges are credible is first and foremost a problem for those who are dependent on U.S. help. We should therefore take our allies' occasional hints about realignment or neutrality with some skepticism; they have every incentive to try to make us worry about it, but in most cases little incentive to actually do it.

## Relations

#### Ideological differences- plan can’t solve relations

Hanson and Lee ’13 - Senior Production Editors at CFR (Updated: 1/31/13, Stephanie, Brianna, Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S.-Cuba Relations”,

<http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113#p5> )

What is the main obstacle in U.S.-Cuban relations? A fundamental incompatibility of political views stands in the way of improving U.S.-Cuban relations, experts say. While experts say the United States wants regime change, "the most important objective of the Cuban government is to remain in power at all costs," says Felix Martin, an assistant professor at Florida International University's Cuban Research Institute. Fidel Castro has been an inspiration for Latin American leftists such as Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and Bolivian President Evo Morales, who have challenged U.S. policy in the region. What are the issues preventing normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations? Experts say these issues include: Human rights violations. In March 2003, the Cuban government arrested seventy-five dissidents and journalists, sentencing them to prison terms of up to twenty-eight years on charges of conspiring with the United States to overthrow the state. The Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, a Havana-based nongovernmental group, reports that the government has in recent years resorted to other tactics besides prison --such as firings from state jobs and intimidation on the street-- to silence opposition figures. A 2005 UN Human Rights Commission vote condemned Cuba's human rights record, but the country was elected to the new UN Human Rights Council in 2006. Guantanamo Bay. Cuba indicated after 9/11 that it would not object if the United States brought prisoners to Guantanamo Bay. However, experts such as Sweig say Cuban officials have since seized on the U.S. prison camp--where hundreds of terror suspects have been detained--as a "symbol of solidarity" with the rest of the world against the United States. Although Obama ordered Guantanamo to be closed by January 22, 2010, the facility remains open as of January 2013, and many analysts say it is likely to stay in operation for an extended period. Cuban exile community. The Cuban-American community in southern Florida traditionally has heavily influenced U.S. policy with Cuba. Both political parties fear alienating a strong voting bloc in an important swing state in presidential elections.

#### Cuba not key to Latin America Relations- other priorities

Suchlicki 2k - Ph.D., Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies (June 2000, Jaime, University of Miami, “The US Embargo of Cuba,” <http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf> )

Cuba is not an important issue in U.S.-Latin American relations. The U.S.-Latin American agenda includes as priority items trade, investment, transfer of technology, migration, drugs, environment, and intellectual property rights. Cuba is not a priority ite m on this agenda.

#### Latin American instability is inevitable and there’s no impact – American intervention checks.

del Vago 06 – El Rincón del Vago, 2006 or later, http://html.rincondelvago.com/international-conflict.html

On the other hand, Donald Nuechterlein claimed that “the fundamental national interest of the United States is the defence and the well-being of its citizens, its territory, and the U.S. constitutional system”. (3, Pg. 310) The Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice promised to resist what she called “the growth of anti-democratic populism in Latin America” (4). While asserting that some rhetoric defined as populist is constructive, Rice said that in Latin America, that normally is not the case. The U.S. agenda's vital interest is to push back a multilateral programme between the Venezuelan government and the “axis of evil” that could shatter the flimsy Latin America stability. In other words, under unipolarity dominated by a democratic pole we are likely to see more attempts to create or advance regional security arrangements (5, Pg. 282), and this is being threatened by Hugo Chavez's new ideologies. According to the logic of the balance-of-threat theory (Walt, 1987), “a hegemonic state can preserve its unipolar position by using policies of accommodation and reassurance in its dealing with status quo states. The dominant state should reinforce their sense of security and should also provide opportunities for these states to demonstrate power or enhance prestige without challenging the existing order. It should also try to take steps to integrate `undecided' states more fully into the existing order, thus turning then into status quo states (Mastanduno, 1999: 148-9 (5, Pg.286))”. Other reasons why the U.S. government is deciding to strike against Venezuela is related to its oil. Venezuelan reserves are 78 billion barrels plus the new reserves founded on the Orinoco: 300 billion are making this the biggest Oil reserve on the planet, and they are geographically located under the United States front door, with no direct threats to be exported until Hugo Chavez's rise to power. Based on those facts, the U.S. International policy against terrorism and such threats apply to Venezuela; Hugo Chavez is not a trustworthy leader, he has not been afraid to set back approach from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This is where the American government is taking action, looking for sanctions based on Hugo Chavez antidemocratic deeds, and using the Inter-American Democratic Charter to aisle the Venezuelan government. If this is not enough, the U.S. government might start using the policy of direct intervention (First military option, with a low intensity). This phase is identified by a low profile of paramilitary actions, sabotages, and others small war strategies. If their attitude remains aggressive and fearless, that is when the complete U.S. military power starts taking action. In contrast, Hugo Chavez had already strike the U.S., not as a terrorist but as a people's person, his strategy is completely unusual, he is given free oil using CITGO Company, a subsidiary of Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), that is located is the U.S., to the people who are living in shelters, and subsidizing up to 40 per cent of the oil market price for the people with low income. This strategy is making him to be recognized as a hero on the east coast of the U.S. But this is not everything, the resulting savings from this initiative, known as Low Income Heating Oil Program, are being used to pay the rent of the people with the lowest income in those communities. Also is dividing politicians, in one side John Negroponte said `Chavez is using Venezuelan petrodollars to finance an “extravagant international policy”, with no direct reference to the generosity with the poor of U.S.', on the other side Charles Rangel, a Democrat, says `This gesture is an example, more Americans are complaining and asking for help to tackle the high price of heat their places (status quo disruption) (6). This strategy have been a complete success, his populism has strike the heart of the United States. Hugo Chavez is following also the scholarship of Griecco: `Dealing with the danger of domination, at the same time, the very wide power disparities with the hegemon create a constant fear of domination and entrapment. The overwhelming power of the hegemon threatens mainly the foreign policy autonomy of the regional states, and also raises the danger of being pulled into unnecessary adventures on its behalf. This also creates for regional states a strong incentive to organize on a regional level. A regional arrangement can be formed in order to be able to maintain a reasonable degree of independence and `voice' within its sphere on influence (Griecco, 1995). While the ability of each individual state to influence the hegemon is limited, by working collectively they can have greater influence, and can make more credible and meaningful threats to raise the cost of certain policies the hegemon may wish to pursue.' (5, Pg. 289). And that is the accord that Hugo Chavez is building in Latin America. This agreement is their first steps between Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, and Argentina as a regional enclave to step out from the American economic domain, and with the indirect-direct help from the Colombian Revolution Army Forces (FARC, with more than 35,000 men) in case of an eventual attack from the U.S. Army against Venezuela. As well, the Venezuelan Army reserves are three times the size of the American counterpart.

## Ethanol

#### Can’t re-build sugar sector – unworkable land and long-time frame.

Soligo ’10 – et al; Ronald Soligo is a professor emeritus of economics at Rice University and a Rice scholar at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy. The author writes a chapter within the book “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,” a Brookings Publication, edited by Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska –obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources – page 102

Three and a half billion gallons seems unrealistic for the foreseeable future. There is some question as to whether Cuba could ever again attain the 1.5 million hectares of sugarcane harvested in 1970, let alone 2 million. According to Brian Pollitt, the 1970 harvest was achieved only by cutting cane that would normally be left to mature for another season in order to produce a higher sugar yield in the following year. 48 Obviously this is not a sustainable practice if optimal yields are to be achieved. Two billion gallons can be produced with a harvested area of 1.33 million hectares and a yield of seventy-five tons per hectare. That area of cultivation is not too far from the average harvest of 1.28 million hectares that Cuba was able to maintain during the 1970s and 1980s. Yet reaching 1.33 million hectares will require time and substantial investment in farm machinery and restoration of the land, which has been neglected and compacted by the use of heavy Soviet-built harvesting machinery. The land will also have to be tilled and newly planted with sugarcane. Achieving higher sugarcane yields will also require time and investments to acquire or develop higher-yielding sugarcane varieties. Cuban yields averaged only fifty-eight tons per hectare during the 1970s and 1980s, substantially below the seventy-five tons per hectare needed to produce 2 billion gallons of ethanol. Yet other countries, as noted, have achieved or exceeded that yield, and some private Cuban farmers are reported to have achieved even higher yields of 100 tons per acre. 49 Yields, of course, are a function of other factors besides cane variety. The condition of the land, access to water and fertilizer, and other inputs would all need to be considered.

#### **Non-unique --- Brazil is investing in Cuban sugar ethanol in the status quo and will only increase.**

Israel 12 – (Esteban, Reuters Correspondent to Brazil, “Brazil to breathe life into faded Cuban sugar sector,” Reuters, 1-30-12, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/30/brazil-cuba-sugar-idAFL2E8CUA7620120130)

SAO PAULO, Jan 30 (Reuters) - Brazilian builder Odebrecht plans to produce sugar in Cuba, the company said on Monday, as looser restrictions on foreign investment in the communist island raise hopes of a recovery in the once-booming sector after decades of decline. News of the project came on the day Brazil's President Dilma Rousseff begins a mostly ceremonial official visit to the country, which has been under communist rule since the Fidel Castro-led revolution and an ensuing U.S. trade embargo. Odebrecht will sign a "contract of productive administration" with Cuba's state sugar company Grupo de Administracion Empresarial del Azucar to operate the 5 de Septiembre mill in Cienfuegos province on the south coast. "The agreement for a period of 10 years aims for an incremental increase in the production of sugar and crushing capacity and help with an overhaul" of the sector, Odebrecht said in an email to Reuters through its press office. The project will finally open the capital-starved Cuban sugar industry to foreign inflows after years of failed attempts by overseas investors to gain a foothold in the sector nationalized several years after the 1959 revolution. Cuba's sugar production has fallen from a peak of 8 million tonnes in 1970 to just 1.2 million tonnes in the last harvest. The country was once the world's top sugar supplier. Odebrecht gave no further details but a Brazilian sugar sector executive told Reuters the contract could be signed this week during Rousseff's two-day visit, deepening Brazil's role in modernizing the island's dilapidated infrastructure. Brazil is not only the world's top sugar producer but a pioneer in cane-derived ethanol, with flex-fuel technology fitted to almost all new cars sold in the country enabling them to run on ethanol or gasoline or any mix of both. Odebrecht is also carrying out work estimated at $800 million to modernize the container port at Mariel, west of Havana. The project, largely financed by Brazil's development bank BNDES, is seen as vital for commerce should the United States lift its trade embargo with the island. Cuba has allowed foreign investment for more than a decade to develop other strategic industries including tourism and more recently, oil, with a consortium led by Spain's Repsol to explore Cuban waters in the Gulf of Mexico. ETHANOL ON AGENDA Cuba, where sugar once accounted for 90 percent of export earnings compared with under 5 percent last year, has drawn up plans to reorganize the industry and allow foreign investment for the first time since mills were nationalized. Its once-powerful Sugar Ministry was abolished last year, leaving it up to a new state-owned company to revamp the rusting industry, with many mills pre-dating the revolution and some built with capital provided by the Soviet Union. Odebrecht would also produce ethanol from sugarcane as well as electricity from the biomass that is left over when the cane is crushed, according to the Brazilian sugar industry executive who is familiar with the details of the project. "Cuba is opening up the possibility of producing ethanol through energy generation and Odebrecht will build a distillery there," the executive said, adding the project is similar to one Odebrecht is developing in Angola. That is a $258 million undertaking in partnership with Angola's Sonagol oil company to produce 260,000 tonnes of sugar, 30 million liters of ethanol and 45 megawatts of electricity. Large-scale ethanol production in Cuba has come up against opposition from former president Castro, a fierce critic of the use of edible crops as fuel. Some experts believe that with sufficient investment, Cuba has the potential to become the world's No. 3 biofuel producer after the United States and Brazil. Ron Soligo, economist at Rice University in Houston, Texas, and an expert on the Cuban sugar industry, calculates that the island could achieve ethanol output of 7.5 billion liters per year. Brazil, by comparison, produces roughly 20 billion liters. "But developing the ethanol sector in Cuba will take time, since most of the (cane-growing) land was abandoned for years," he said. Brazil, the world's No. 2 ethanol producer, has offered technical assistance to Cuba to produce the biofuel from cane. "The subject is on the table. There are investments planned in sugar and there exists a possibility that at some time this will be taken on board by the ethanol industry," a source at Brazil's foreign ministry told Reuters.

#### No impact to Biod

Easterbrook 3(Gregg, senior fellow at the New Republic, visiting fellow of the Brookings Institute, “We're All Gonna Die!”, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1&topic=&topic\_set=)

If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure up. A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines might converge in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an adaptation. Environmental collapse might make parts of the globe unpleasant, but considering that the biosphere has survived ice ages, it wouldn't be the final curtain. Depression, which has become 10 times more prevalent in Western nations in the postwar era, might grow so widespread that vast numbers of people would refuse to get out of bed, a possibility that Petranek suggested in a doomsday talk at the Technology Entertainment Design conference in 2002. But Marcel Proust, as miserable as he was, wrote *Remembrance of Things Past* while lying in bed.

6 degree warming inevitable

AP 9 – (Associated Press, Six Degree Temperature Rise by 2100 is Inevitable: UNEP, September 24, <http://www.speedy-fit.co.uk/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=168>)

Earth's temperature is likely to jump six degrees between now and the end of the century even if every country cuts greenhouse gas emissions as proposed, according to a United Nations update. Scientists looked at emission plans from 192 nations and calculated what would happen to global warming. The projections take into account 80 percent emission cuts from the U.S. and Europe by 2050, which are not sure things. The U.S. figure is based on a bill that passed the House of Representatives but is running into resistance in the Senate, where debate has been delayed by health care reform efforts. Carbon dioxide, mostly from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, is the main cause of global warming, trapping the sun's energy in the atmosphere. The world's average temperature has already risen 1.4 degrees since the 19th century. Much of projected rise in temperature is because of developing nations, which aren't talking much about cutting their emissions, scientists said at a United Nations press conference Thursday. China alone adds nearly 2 degrees to the projections. "We are headed toward very serious changes in our planet," said Achim Steiner, head of the U.N.'s environment program, which issued the update on Thursday. The review looked at some 400 peer-reviewed papers on climate over the last three years. Even if the developed world cuts its emissions by 80 percent and the developing world cuts theirs in half by 2050, as some experts propose, the world is still facing a 3-degree increase by the end of the century, said Robert Corell, a prominent U.S. climate scientist who helped oversee the update. Corell said the most likely agreement out of the international climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December still translates into a nearly 5-degree increase in world temperature by the end of the century. European leaders and the Obama White House have set a goal to limit warming to just a couple degrees. The U.N.'s environment program unveiled the update on peer-reviewed climate change science to tell diplomats how hot the planet is getting. The last big report from the Nobel Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change came out more than two years ago and is based on science that is at least three to four years old, Steiner said. Global warming is speeding up, especially in the Arctic, and that means that some top-level science projections from 2007 are already out of date and overly optimistic. Corell, who headed an assessment of warming in the Arctic, said global warming "is accelerating in ways that we are not anticipating." Because Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets are melting far faster than thought, it looks like the seas will rise twice as fast as projected just three years ago, Corell said. He said seas should rise about a foot every 20 to 25 years.

#### Their impact claims are alarmist and based on false climate data

WSJ 1/27 (Claude Allegre, former director of the Institute for the Study of the Earth, University of Paris; J. Scott Armstrong, cofounder of the Journal of Forecasting and the International Journal of Forecasting; Jan Breslow, head of the Laboratory of Biochemical Genetics and Metabolism, Rockefeller University; Roger Cohen, fellow, American Physical Society; Edward David, member, National Academy of Engineering and National Academy of Sciences; William Happer, professor of physics, Princeton; Michael Kelly, professor of technology, University of Cambridge, U.K.; William Kininmonth, former head of climate research at the Australian Bureau of Meteorology; Richard Lindzen, professor of atmospheric sciences, MIT; James McGrath, professor of chemistry, Virginia Technical University; Rodney Nichols, former president and CEO of the New York Academy of Sciences; Burt Rutan, aerospace engineer, designer of Voyager and SpaceShipOne; Harrison H. Schmitt, Apollo 17 astronaut and former U.S. senator; Nir Shaviv, professor of astrophysics, Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Henk Tennekes, former director, Royal Dutch Meteorological Service; Antonio Zichichi, president of the World Federation of Scientists, Geneva, “No Need to Panic About Global Warming”, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204301404577171531838421366.html?mod=googlenews\_wsj)

Candidates should understand that the oft-repeated claim that nearly all scientists demand that something dramatic be done to stop global warming is not true. In fact, a large and growing number of distinguished scientists and engineers do not agree that drastic actions on global warming are needed. In September, Nobel Prize-winning physicist Ivar Giaever, a supporter of President Obama in the last election, publicly resigned from the American Physical Society (APS) with a letter that begins: "I did not renew [my membership] because I cannot live with the [APS policy] statement: 'The evidence is incontrovertible: Global warming is occurring. If no mitigating actions are taken, significant disruptions in the Earth's physical and ecological systems, social systems, security and human health are likely to occur. We must reduce emissions of greenhouse gases beginning now.' In the APS it is OK to discuss whether the mass of the proton changes over time and how a multi-universe behaves, but the evidence of global warming is incontrovertible?" In spite of a multidecade international campaign to enforce the message that increasing amounts of the "pollutant" carbon dioxide will destroy civilization, large numbers of scientists, many very prominent, share the opinions of Dr. Giaever. And the number of scientific "heretics" is growing with each passing year. The reason is a collection of stubborn scientific facts. Perhaps the most inconvenient fact is the lack of global warming for well over 10 years now. This is known to the warming establishment, as one can see from the 2009 "Climategate" email of climate scientist Kevin Trenberth: "The fact is that we can't account for the lack of warming at the moment and it is a travesty that we can't." But the warming is only missing if one believes computer models where so-called feedbacks involving water vapor and clouds greatly amplify the small effect of CO2. The lack of warming for more than a decade—indeed, the smaller-than-predicted warming over the 22 years since the U.N.'s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) began issuing projections—suggests that computer models have greatly exaggerated how much warming additional CO2 can cause. Faced with this embarrassment, those promoting alarm have shifted their drumbeat from warming to weather extremes, to enable anything unusual that happens in our chaotic climate to be ascribed to CO2. The fact is that CO2 is not a pollutant. CO2 is a colorless and odorless gas, exhaled at high concentrations by each of us, and a key component of the biosphere's life cycle. Plants do so much better with more CO2 that greenhouse operators often increase the CO2 concentrations by factors of three or four to get better growth. This is no surprise since plants and animals evolved when CO2 concentrations were about 10 times larger than they are today. Better plant varieties, chemical fertilizers and agricultural management contributed to the great increase in agricultural yields of the past century, but part of the increase almost certainly came from additional CO2 in the atmosphere. Enlarge Image Corbis Although the number of publicly dissenting scientists is growing, many young scientists furtively say that while they also have serious doubts about the global-warming message, they are afraid to speak up for fear of not being promoted—or worse. They have good reason to worry. In 2003, Dr. Chris de Freitas, the editor of the journal Climate Research, dared to publish a peer-reviewed article with the politically incorrect (but factually correct) conclusion that the recent warming is not unusual in the context of climate changes over the past thousand years. The international warming establishment quickly mounted a determined campaign to have Dr. de Freitas removed from his editorial job and fired from his university position. Fortunately, Dr. de Freitas was able to keep his university job. This is not the way science is supposed to work, but we have seen it before—for example, in the frightening period when Trofim Lysenko hijacked biology in the Soviet Union. Soviet biologists who revealed that they believed in genes, which Lysenko maintained were a bourgeois fiction, were fired from their jobs. Many were sent to the gulag and some were condemned to death. Why is there so much passion about global warming, and why has the issue become so vexing that the American Physical Society, from which Dr. Giaever resigned a few months ago, refused the seemingly reasonable request by many of its members to remove the word "incontrovertible" from its description of a scientific issue? There are several reasons, but a good place to start is the old question "cui bono?" Or the modern update, "Follow the money." Alarmism over climate is of great benefit to many, providing government funding for academic research and a reason for government bureaucracies to grow. Alarmism also offers an excuse for governments to raise taxes, taxpayer-funded subsidies for businesses that understand how to work the political system, and a lure for big donations to charitable foundations promising to save the planet. Lysenko and his team lived very well, and they fiercely defended their dogma and the privileges it brought them. Speaking for many scientists and engineers who have looked carefully and independently at the science of climate, we have a message to any candidate for public office: There is no compelling scientific argument for drastic action to "decarbonize" the world's economy. Even if one accepts the inflated climate forecasts of the IPCC, aggressive greenhouse-gas control policies are not justified economically. A recent study of a wide variety of policy options by Yale economist William Nordhaus showed that nearly the highest benefit-to-cost ratio is achieved for a policy that allows 50 more years of economic growth unimpeded by greenhouse gas controls. This would be especially beneficial to the less-developed parts of the world that would like to share some of the same advantages of material well-being, health and life expectancy that the fully developed parts of the world enjoy now. Many other policy responses would have a negative return on investment. And it is likely that more CO2 and the modest warming that may come with it will be an overall benefit to the planet. If elected officials feel compelled to "do something" about climate, we recommend supporting the excellent scientists who are increasing our understanding of climate with well-designed instruments on satellites, in the oceans and on land, and in the analysis of observational data. The better we understand climate, the better we can cope with its ever-changing nature, which has complicated human life throughout history. However, much of the huge private and government investment in climate is badly in need of critical review. Every candidate should support rational measures to protect and improve our environment, but it makes no sense at all to back expensive programs that divert resources from real needs and are based on alarming but untenable claims of "incontrovertible" evidence.

#### No extinction from disease

Malcolm Gladwell, writer for The New Yorker and best-selling author The New Republic, July 17 and 24, 1995, excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, 1999, p. 31-32

Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adapt a specific strategy but every strategy carries a corresponding cost and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all hut halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability its essential rigidity is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. AIDS is almost invariably lethal because it attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. Viruses are not superhuman. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flue, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms.

#### **Aff doesn’t solve – only increases US corn output – can’t solve globally**

#### **No scarcity and no impact**

Jalsevac 4(Paul, Life site news a division of Interim Publishing, “The Inherent Racism of Population Control”, <http://www.lifesite.net/waronfamily/Population_Control/Inherentracism.pdf>)

The pattern continues today. Economist Dennis Avery explained in 1995 that, food production was more than keeping pace with population growth since the world had, “more than doubled world food output in the past 30 years. We have raised food supplies per person by 25 percent in the populous Third World.”4 The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO) also dispelled fears of shortages in the food supply when, in preparation for the World Food Summit in Rome in November of 1995 it reported that, “Globally food supplies have more than doubled in the last 40 years…at a global level, there is probably no obstacle to food production rising to meet demand.”5 The UNFAO also later estimated that, simply with the present available technologies fully employed, the world could feed 30 to 35 billion people, i.e. roughly six times the present world population.6 It also reported that the number of people considered malnourished has declined from 36 percent in 1961-1970 to 20 percent in 1988-90 and later proclaimed that “earlier fears of chronic food shortages over much of the world proved unfounded.”7 The World Bank joined in to predict in 1993 that the improvement in the world food supply would continue, while pointing out that in developing countries grain production has grown at a faster rate than population since 1985. Grain production has slowed in the United States, but that is because stocks have grown so large that additional production could not be stored.8 A further wealth of evidence is available to remove any concerns about resource shortage in the modern world.

## Nat Sec

No risk of prolif, it wouldn’t cause a chain reaction, and it would be slow at worst - your evidence is alarmism

Gavin 10 (Francis, Tom Slick Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law @ the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs @ the University of Texas at Austin, “Sam As It Ever Was; Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War,” Lexis)

Fears of a tipping point were especially acute in the aftermath of China's 1964 detonation of an atomic bomb: it was predicted that India, Indonesia, and Japan might follow, with consequences worldwide, as "Israel, Sweden, Germany, and other potential nuclear countries far from China and India would be affected by proliferation in Asia." 40 A U.S. government document identified "at least eleven nations (India, Japan, Israel, Sweden, West Germany, Italy, Canada, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Rumania, and Yugoslavia)" with the capacity to go nuclear, a number that would soon "grow substantially" to include "South Africa, the United Arab Republic, Spain, Brazil and Mexico." 41 A top-secret, blue-ribbon committee established to craft the U.S. response contended that "the [1964] Chinese nuclear explosion has increased the urgency and complexity of this problem by creating strong pressures to develop independent nuclear forces, which, in turn, could strongly influence the plans of other potential nuclear powers." 42 These predictions were largely wrong. In 1985 the National Intelligence Council noted that for "almost thirty years the Intelligence Community has been writing about which nations might next get the bomb." All of these estimates based their largely pessimistic and ultimately incorrect estimates on factors such as the increased "access to fissile materials," improved technical capabilities in countries, the likelihood of "chain reactions," or a "scramble" to proliferation when "even one additional state demonstrates a nuclear capability." The 1985 report goes on, "The most striking characteristic of the present-day nuclear proliferation scene is that, despite the alarms rung by past Estimates, no additional overt proliferation of nuclear weapons has actually occurred since China tested its bomb in 1964." Although "some proliferation of nuclear explosive capabilities and other major proliferation-related developments have taken place in the past two decades," they did not have "the damaging, systemwide impacts that the Intelligence community generally anticipated they would." 43 In his analysis of more than sixty years of failed efforts to accurately predict nuclear proliferation, analyst Moeed Yusuf concludes that "the pace of proliferation has been much slower than anticipated by most." The majority of countries suspected of trying to obtain a nuclear weapons capability "never even came close to crossing the threshold. In fact, most did not even initiate a weapons program." If all the countries that were considered prime suspects over the past sixty years had developed nuclear weapons, "the world would have at least 19 nuclear powers today." 44 As Potter and Mukhatzhanova argue, government and academic experts frequently "exaggerated the scope and pace of nuclear weapons proliferation." 45 Nor is there compelling evidence that a nuclear proliferation chain reaction will ever occur. Rather, the pool of potential proliferators has been shrinking. Proliferation pressures were far greater during the Cold War. In the 1960s, at least twenty-one countries either had or were considering nuclear weapons research programs. Today only nine countries are known to have nuclear weapons. Belarus, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Libya, South Africa, Sweden, and Ukraine have dismantled their weapons programs. Even rogue states that are/were a great concern to U.S. policymakers--Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea--began their nuclear weapons programs before the Cold War had ended. 46 As far as is known, no nation has started a new nuclear weapons program since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. 47 Ironically, by focusing on the threat of rogue states, policymakers

#### **No acquisition – structural barriers**

Fettweis 10 Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College.

(Christopher J. Fettweis, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” [\_\_Survival\_\_](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title~db=all~content=t713659919), Volume [\_\_52\_\_](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title~db=all~content=t713659919~tab=issueslist~branches=52#v52), Issue [\_\_2\_\_](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title~db=all~content=g920313969) April 2010 , pages 59 – 82//informaworld) KENTUCKY

Even terrorists equipped with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons would be incapable of causing damage so cataclysmic that it would prove fatal to modern states. Though the prospect of terrorists obtaining and using such weapons is one of the most consistently terrifying scenarios of the new era, it is also highly unlikely and not nearly as dangerous as sometimes portrayed. As the well-funded, well-staffed Aum Shinrikyo cult found out in the 1990s, workable forms of weapons of mass destruction are hard to purchase, harder still to synthesise without state help, and challenging to use effectively. The Japanese group managed to kill a dozen people on the Tokyo subway system at rush hour. While tragic, the attack was hardly the stuff of apocalyptic nightmares. Super-weapons are simply not easy for even the most sophisticated non-state actors to use.[31](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a920295991&fulltext=713240928#EN0031) If terrorists were able to overcome the substantial obstacles and use the most destructive weapons in a densely populated area, the outcome would of course be terrible for those unfortunate enough to be nearby. But we should not operate under the illusion that doomsday would arrive. Modern industrialised countries can cope with disasters, both natural and man-made. As unpleasant as such events would be, they do not represent existential threats.

#### No impact

Simon and Stevenson 10 - \* senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations AND \*\* professor of strategic studies at the U.S. Naval War College (Steven and Jonathan, “Focus on thwarting 'simpler' attacks,” 5/4, http://www.statesman.com/opinion/simon-stevenson-focus-on-thwarting-simpler-attacks-669676.html)

But the attempt to bring a less destructive terrorist technique to bear in New York may put the lie to that explanation. While we have not seen a single attack as horrific as the collapse of the twin towers, al Qaeda and its followers have killed far more people — Americans and other nationalities — using various forms of improvised explosive devices in war zones and ostensibly peaceful locales. Some 65 percent of the military casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan have been from improvised explosive devices, the Army Times reported last year. Many of them, like the Times Square device, are activated by or packed in vehicles; several of al Qaeda's most devastating attacks since 2001 — such as bombings that killed 202 people, mainly tourists, in Bali in 2002 — involved such devices. Terrorist tactics spread by virtue of success. Consider the number of airline hijackings in the 1960s and 1970s. These days, vehicle-borne IEDs are suited to urban spaces, in which cars are commonplace and inconspicuous and dense populations mean relatively high numbers of casualties. These points would not be lost on jihadist leaders and aspiring acolytes, who tend to be students of their craft. While many questions remain about the bombing attempt — though U.S. officials have deemed it terrorist activity, and a key leader of the Taliban in Pakistan has claimed credit — we do know that al Qaeda is pragmatic and adaptive. However precious al Qaeda may deem the "stun value" of the next big attack on America, the effectiveness of U.S. actions to thwart such an incident was eventually likely to compel it to downgrade expectations. Now, perhaps, al Qaeda has. The attempted Christmas bombing on a U.S. airliner was certainly a less complex and ambitious operation than Sept. 11 — or, for that matter, the 2004 Madrid attacks, the 2005 London subway bombings or the 2006 Heathrow plot. Even if the core group has not given up on the grand apocalyptic attack, anti-terrorist activity in Pakistan has compelled it to devolve operational authority to regional affiliates and homegrown terrorist aspirants who are free — if not encouraged — to use less operationally demanding methods. And that sort of urban warfare was long ago introduced and developed in places such as Belfast and Bilbao, then refined and expanded in Iraq and Afghanistan, with the advent of explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) and "sticky bombs," which are smaller and more precise than car bombs and may be harder to detect. It would be a mistake for al Qaeda's targets to regard that tactical adjustment as any kind of victory. Old techniques such as car and bus bombs, though not as massively lethal as the new ones — such as turning a hijacked airplane into a guided missile, or detonating a "dirty bomb" or even a small atomic device — would signify mainly that jihadists are starting to consider more frequent terrorist attacks that are far easier to execute and get away with. That kind of approach won favor with Northern Ireland's Provisional Irish Republican Army in its drive to unite Ireland, and with the Basque separatist group Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain. These groups, which evolved into highly capable and professional organizations, challenged civil order and palsied society for decades, claiming roughly 2,200 and 1,000 lives, respectively.

# 2NC

## Russia

### 2NC – Overview

#### Russian collapse ensures nuclear war – two scenarios – FIRST is terrorist proliferation – scientists have an incentive to sell knowledge – SECOND is Russian lashout – economic decline breeds nationalism – political instability means Putin has an incentive to strike the US – proves we control Timeframe and Probability – that’s Filger

#### Magnitude – we outweigh

Nick **Bostrum**, Professor of Philosophy, Yale University, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards,” 200**2**, www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html.

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

### 2NC – Russia Econ Up

#### Russia economy increasing – no evidence to suggest economy is decline – government would have increased borrowing – no recession – that’s Adomanis

#### Russian Economy will not collapse – stable now

Adomanis 8/27 – (2013, Mark Contributor for Forbes Magazine, http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2013/08/27/do-you-think-russias-economy-is-doomed-the-bond-market-doesnt-agree/) rss

Earlier this year I wrote [several articles](http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2013/01/07/why-russias-economy-isnt-going-to-collapse/) pushing back against some [particularly alarmist](http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/12/30/the-end-of-putinomics.html) interpretations of Russia’s economy. After predicting Russia’s imminent implosion no less than 6 or 7 different times over the past decade I’m genuinely amazed that Owen Matthews wasn’t a little more gunshy in saying that 2013 was definitely the year in which everything would come crashing down around the Kremlin’s ears, but you really do not need to search very long or hard to find people who are [extremely disdainful](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-20/is-russia-already-in-recession-.html) of Russia’s economic performance and of the “obliviousness” and general stupidity of its policy makers.¶ It’s true that Russia’s economy is [slowing down](http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2013/08/19/russias-economy-really-is-slowing-down-unemployment-ticked-up-in-q2-2013/) and its also true that the authorities [don’t have any easy choices](http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/26/us-russia-gdp-forecast-idUSBRE97P0C620130826): monetary easing will likely spark inflation, and the state’s ability to engage in fiscal pump-priming is highly constrained. Growth over the next few years will be decidedly sub-par when compared to the 2000 boom years and even to the modest 2010-12 bounce back from the Great Recession.¶ However, if Russia really was rapidly approaching an economic dead-end, if there was increasingly recognition that its model was not going to survive, you would expect to see the Russian government’s borrowing costs go up. Yes Russia’s stock of government debt is not particularly large (at only around 10% of GDP) but if the market came to an understanding that the economic situation was going to get a lot worse in the not too distant future then investors would demand higher returns. Demand for Russian debt would go down, and the interest rates on that debt would go up. Economics 101.¶ And that’s exactly what happened during the worst days of the 2008-09 crisis: Russia’s borrowing costs skyrocketed from around 7% to almost 11% because there were serious, and perfectly understandable, doubts about Russia’s ability to weather the economic storm.¶ Since the crisis ended, however, the interest rates on long-term Russian government securities haven’t done much – they’ve bounced around within a relatively narrow range and are at about the same level now that they were back in 2006. This would seem, to me at least, to reflect market expectations of business as usual: not overly-rapid economic growth, but certainly not some sort of spectacular collapse.¶ Is it possible that the bond market is wrong? Sure. It’s possible that the market is wrong just as it is possible that Putin will be overthrown before the end of the year or that I will win the lottery. Almost anything is possible. But it certainly does not seem likely that the bond market would be so studiously immune to a mounting economic catastrophe. What that chart says to me is that things will continue in pretty much same vein, and that there aren’t going to be any big changes one way or another.¶ Russia’s economy might not be performing particularly well at the moment, but there’s very little evidence that it’s going to come screeching to a halt. So if like many Westerners you’re eagerly waiting for Putin to be ousted by a crippling economic crisis, you’re going to be waiting for a long time.

#### **$100 is keeping it on the brink**

Ostrouckh and Marson 9/2 – Andrey Ostrouckh and James Marson, Senior Writers for the Wall Street Journal, 9/2/13, (“Slowdown Is Forcing Russia to Trim Spending, Says Putin”, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324432404579051040700939878.html>, AW)

Any cuts that hit the pocketbooks of Mr. Putin's main supporters—state workers and pensioners—"will spark growing discontent, which will ruin trust in Mr. Putin," said Lev Gudkov, head of the Levada Center.¶ The Kremlin has largely quelled political protests that sprang up in 2011-2012 amid accusations of vote fraud by Mr. Putin's United Russia party in a parliamentary election. The government has passed laws restricting public gatherings, at the same time as restarting direct regional elections.¶ A continued slowdown in Russia's economy could broaden anger outside Moscow, where those protests occurred, Mr. Gudkov said, leading Mr. Putin to intensify criticism of the West, which has sharpened in recent months.¶ Under pressure to reinvigorate the country's economy, Russia's government had proposed a multibillion-dollar stimulus plan of investments in roads and railways. That plan will be funded from the rainy-day fund of windfall oil revenues, which the Kremlin used to support the economy in 2008 and 2009.¶ The central bank has so far resisted calls from some officials and industrialists to cut interest rates to boost growth as long as inflation remains above its target of 6%.¶ Economists said the government could manage to fulfill the president's spending pledges by juggling expenditures and trimming in other areas. "But if economic slowdown continues and oil prices hover around $100 per barrel, then there might be a need to cut other spending," said Dmitry Polevoy, economist at ING Bank in Moscow

#### Russian Economy slowing but still will improve over next two quarters

Reuters 8/28 – (2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/28/russia-sberbank-profit-idUSL6N0GS3BH20130828) rss

"Our net profit will be close to the lower end of our forecast," Chief Executive German Gref told a conference call, stopping short of formally revising an earnings guidance range of 370-390 billion roubles.¶ The former Soviet state savings bank said it set aside 30.9 billion roubles against potential bad loans in the second quarter - nearly 15 times higher than the year-earlier figure of 2.1 billion roubles.¶ Analysts had expected the bank to set aside 30.2 billion.¶ The Economy Ministry cut its 2013 economic growth forecast on Monday to 1.8 percent from 2.4 percent, blaming weaker exports and consumption.¶ State-controlled Sberbank accounts for 29 percent of Russia's total banking assets and holds 46 percent of household deposits, making it a bellwether for the country's $2 trillion economy.¶ Gref, a former Russian economy minister, told analysts on a conference call that the first half of the year had been more difficult than expected, but he forecast a slight improvement in the economy in the third and fourth quarters of the year.

### 2NC – Cuba

#### Plan unlocks Cuban reserves – massively increases oil production – that spikes prices – prefer our evidence – it’s contexualized to the way CUBA affects GLOBAL MARKET PRICES – that’s Cala

#### **Lifting the embargo is the only way to increase drilling in Cuba**

Gould, 9 – (Jens Erik Gould, Associated Press Staff Writer for Bloomberg. April 3, 2009. “Cuba Would Welcome U.S. Oil Companies If Embargo Ends (Update2),” http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=anxecGjW.7\_U)//SDL

April 3 (Bloomberg) -- Cuba would welcome U.S. companies’ help developing its oil industry should the 47-year trade embargo on the communist island come to an end, said Manuel Marrero Faz, senior oil adviser at the Ministry of Basic Industries.¶ “We are open,” said Marrero Faz, noting that Chinese, Russian and Angolan companies are in talks to explore areas about 100 miles off the U.S. coast. “We’re very close to each other. We’re neighbors. Why not do business?”¶ Should nearby U.S. companies offer services and supplies, Cuba would be able to lower its costs and pick up the pace of development, said Marrero Faz, who learned geology as a student in the former Soviet Union. The difficulty of getting equipment from partners halfway around the world is a key reason only one offshore well has been drilled so far, he said.¶ Marrero Faz’s comments represent one of the strongest signals yet that Cuban President Raul Castro is ready for a new relationship with the U.S. under President Barack Obama. In Washington, Cuba’s incipient oil industry is helping fuel a growing campaign to ease the trade embargo that President John F. Kennedy imposed in 1962 to try to topple Fidel Castro’s Soviet-allied regime.¶ U.S. business interests -- watching from the sidelines as global competitors scoop up contracts -- as well as lawmakers and policy groups are becoming more vocal that the time for a change has come.¶ ‘Taking the Fields’¶ “It’s stupid that the U.S. prohibits its companies from coming here,” said Gustavo Echeverria, a researcher at Cuba’s Center for Petroleum Investigation, who spoke after giving a presentation at a Havana oil conference last month. “Everyone else is taking the fields on its doorstep.”

#### They have huge reserves

Tim Padgett, (staff writer) TIME, Oct. 23, 2008. Retrieved Apr. 21, 2013 from http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1853252,00.html For decades, the only promise most Cubans saw in the ocean north of their island was the current that carries homemade rafts to Florida. That all changed a few years ago when geologists estimated that between 5 billion bbl. and 10 billion bbl. of oil lie beneath the waters off Cuba's northwest coast. Suddenly it seemed as though the hemisphere's sole communist nation might finally end its desperate dependence on oil-rich allies like the former Soviet Union and Venezuela — and perhaps even escape its impoverished economic time warp altogether.

### 2NC – Prices K2 Econ

#### High oil prices key to Russian economy – half of government revenue is from oil – reliance is still high – that’s Schuman 12.

#### Declining oil prices trigger economic crisis in Russia

**Bush, 12 –** (Jason Bush, Associated Press Staff Writer for Reuters. July 2, 2012. “Oil-price slide highlights risks to Putin's Russia,” http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/07/02/uk-russia-oil-idUKLNE86102820120702)//SDL

Falling oil prices could trigger a prolonged slump in Russia that would lay bare the growing fiscal risks, threatening President Vladimir Putin's election promise to increase wages and fanning public discontent.¶ The world's largest oil producer is well-placed in the short run to withstand sliding prices, thanks to sizeable cash reserves and a flexible rouble. An d P u tin, who returned to the Kremlin after March's election, is still widely popular.¶ But the oil price has fallen by over $30 dollars in the last three months, to close to $90 per barrel, and may fall further, narrowing his room for budgetary manoeuvre just as mass protests have underscored dissatisfaction with the government.¶ "This is not the best start for the new government," said Peter Westin, chief strategist Aton brokerage in Moscow.¶ "If the oil price is temporarily at these levels, or even lower, it's not a huge problem. The issue is whether it stays there."¶ Oil and gas taxes account for around half of revenues raised by the federal budget, which Putin, as prime minister, used to boost public sector pay and pensions as a way of overcoming the 2009 economic slump.¶ Putin, who has taken a more populist approach to dealing with his declining popularity, promised even more public sector pay rises as part of his election campaign.¶ While that would cushion the immediate blow of any slowdown, running down the fiscal reserves to maintain high social spending would only increase Russia's long-term vulnerability to yet another oil price shock.¶ "In the short term they can sustain a very low oil price, but they need to address the structural problems in health, education and pensions," said Ivan Tchakarov, chief Russia economist at Renaissance Capital.¶ "This is not a sustainable fiscal policy, there's no question about it."¶ DEPENDENCY¶ The last time oil prices fell so precipitously, in 2009, Russia's economy slumped by a dramatic 8 percent. Collapsing oil was also a catalyst for Russia's 1998 economic crisis that ended in devaluation and default.¶ Putin, in his annual statement on the budget on Thursday, acknowledged that Russia's reliance on energy prices was one of its biggest policy headaches.¶ "The Russian budgetary system is highly dependent on the situation on world commodity markets," he said. "This limits the opportunities for budget manoeuvre."¶ For now, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov has earmarked $6 billion that could be spent in 2012 f rom a budget rainy-day fund should a deteriorating global economy drag on growth in Russia.¶ "We hope we don't have to make use of these measures, because the steps being taken by the government and central bank are sufficient," Siluanov said.¶ He trimmed his 2013 budget deficit forecast to 1.5 percent of gross domestic product, assuming an average oil price of $97 per barrel. The fiscal plan will help keep the national debt, now around 10 percent of GDP, manageably low.¶ BUFFER¶ Analysts say the impact on Russia of lower oil prices may be milder than during previous falls.¶ "In the short term, in the next one to three years, we are fine," said Tchakarov.¶ He noted that according to Finance Ministry calculations, every one dollar fall in the oil price means that the government loses around 55 billion roubles in oil-related taxes over the course of a year.¶ With the budget presently balancing at around $115 per barrel, an oil price of $90 per barrel, if sustained over a full year, would leave the government short to the tune of around $40 billion a year.¶ But that is still just a fraction of the $185 billion that Russia has stashed away in two fiscal reserve funds, designed to stabilise the budget in just such an emergency.¶ Even at $60 per barrel - the average oil price during the crisis year of 2009 - the reserve funds could cover the shortfall for about two years.¶ "I find this worrying about the budget at this moment a little beside the point," said Clemens Grafe, chief Russia economist at Goldman Sachs.¶ "The fiscal buffers they have to absorb this are going to be sufficient without cutting expenditure."¶ Analysts also point out that since the previous financial crisis in 2008-2009, the central bank has radically changed the exchange rate regime, allowing the rouble to fall in line with the cheaper oil price.¶ Since oil began its latest slide in mid-March, the rouble has lost around 15 percent of its value against the dollar.¶ "The rouble weakened exactly in line with the oil price. And a weaker rouble is very good because it will secure the rouble equivalent of oil taxes for the budget," said Evgeny Gavrilenkov, chief economist at Troika Dialog.¶ SIGNIFICANT SLOWDOWN¶ Despite these buffers, most economists expect that a sustained fall in the oil price would cause a significant slowdown in Russia's economic growth - still a surprisingly resilient 4.2 percent in May.¶ "Between $70 and $80 per barrel you will have a recession," said Westin from Aton.¶ Russia's ability to maintain government spending is limited by the so called non-oil deficit - a measure of the underlying state of the budget once oil taxes are removed - that has ballooned from 5 percent of gross domestic product in 2008 to over 10 percent this year.¶ Even before the latest decline in the oil price, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank were urging Russia to scale back this underlying deficit by cutting down on bloated government spending.¶ In a recent interview with Reuters, Russia's deputy prime minister Igor Shuvalov vowed that while the government intended to use its reserves to maintain expenditures this year, next year's budget would be "very frugal, tight and responsible".¶ That implies that sooner or later, falling oil prices will force cutbacks that will hit the pockets of ordinary Russians.¶ "The silver lining of a failing oil price is that it does increase the urgency of social reform and budget cuts," says Kingsmill Bond, chief Russia strategist at Citigroup.

#### Oil is sold on world markets—prices all move together:

RF 10 – (Resources For the Future, February 3, 2010, “Reassessing the Oil Security Premium,”<http://www.rff.org/News/Features/Pages/Reassessing-the-Oil-Security-Premium.aspx>)

Further complicating matters, consumers cannot distinguish between a barrel of oil produced in Saudi Arabia and one produced in Alaska because all oil is sold on the same market, with prices moving together. However, domestic oil production is stable, whereas production outside the United States contains unstable elements, giving policymakers a reason to differentiate between domestic and imported oil even if consumers cannot.

## Cerrado

#### Soy makes destruction inevitable

Newell ’11 – Philip Newell is internally citing the WWF Report– Soya and the Cerrado: Brazil’s forgotten jewel. He is a research intern with the Nourishing the Planet project. August 2nd – http://blogs.worldwatch.org/nourishingtheplanet/wwf-report-soya-and-the-cerrado-brazil%E2%80%99s-forgotten-jewel/

According to a recent report released by WWF UK, the increased use of soy beans has had painful consequences for the Cerrado region of Brazil. The Cerrado is the unique savannah south of the Amazon Rainforest. This landscape, once covering a quarter of Brazil, holds an amazing 5 percent of all life on Earth. Since the prehistoric days when there was only one continent, this grassy expanse has harbored not only 11,000 flowering plants (nearly half are found only in the Cerrado) but also countless animal species, including the giant anteater and maned wolf. This rich history also imbues the land with cultural significance, as it has played a key role for over 10,000 years in the culture and religion of a variety of indigenous Brazilian societies. Currently, however, the Cerrado is being converted into farmland for the express purpose of growing soybeans (soya). In only 15 years, production of soy has doubled, now covering an area almost the size of Egypt worldwide. In Brazil, there are 24.1 million hectares planted with soy, equivalent to the size of the United Kingdom. Such a prolific conversion has devastated the natural biodiversity of the region. A recent survey suggests that by 2008, almost half of the original vegetation cover had been lost, disappearing at a rate significantly greater than the Amazon rainforest. This also has significant consequences for climate change. According to WWF, in the six year period between 2002 and 2008, land-use change in the Cerrado released 275 million tons of CO2 per year-more than half the total emissions for the United Kingdom. A whopping 80 percent of the soy grown worldwide is used for feeding cows, pigs, chickens and other livestock, according to the report. Current trends suggest that developing countries will continue to increase their meat consumption, until they match levels of developed countries. If soy remains one of the main components of livestock feed, then soy production will increase. Since most land planted with soy has already achieved maximum production levels (only the Indian region has room for improving yields), demand for land for soy planting will grow.

### 1NC – Food Scarcity Frontline

#### **Aff doesn’t solve – only increases US corn output – can’t solve globally**

#### **No scarcity and no impact**

Jalsevac 4(Paul, Life site news a division of Interim Publishing, “The Inherent Racism of Population Control”, <http://www.lifesite.net/waronfamily/Population_Control/Inherentracism.pdf>)

The pattern continues today. Economist Dennis Avery explained in 1995 that, food production was more than keeping pace with population growth since the world had, “more than doubled world food output in the past 30 years. We have raised food supplies per person by 25 percent in the populous Third World.”4 The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO) also dispelled fears of shortages in the food supply when, in preparation for the World Food Summit in Rome in November of 1995 it reported that, “Globally food supplies have more than doubled in the last 40 years…at a global level, there is probably no obstacle to food production rising to meet demand.”5 The UNFAO also later estimated that, simply with the present available technologies fully employed, the world could feed 30 to 35 billion people, i.e. roughly six times the present world population.6 It also reported that the number of people considered malnourished has declined from 36 percent in 1961-1970 to 20 percent in 1988-90 and later proclaimed that “earlier fears of chronic food shortages over much of the world proved unfounded.”7 The World Bank joined in to predict in 1993 that the improvement in the world food supply would continue, while pointing out that in developing countries grain production has grown at a faster rate than population since 1985. Grain production has slowed in the United States, but that is because stocks have grown so large that additional production could not be stored.8 A further wealth of evidence is available to remove any concerns about resource shortage in the modern world.

### 2NC – Ext: No Impact Warming

#### Claims of warming causing wars and destruction are speculative and wrong

NIPCC 10. Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change. Past Warm Episodes did not Cause Extinction. 15 July 2010. <http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2010/jul/15jul2010a7.html>

Many claims have been made about catastrophic negative effects of increasing air temperature on biodiversity; but nearly all of these claims are based on either speculation or simple correlative models. In the study of Willis *et al*. (2010), on the other hand, past historical periods were identified in which climate was either similar to that projected by global climate models for the next century or so, or in which the rate of temperature change was unusually rapid; and these *real*-world periods were examined to see if any *real*-world climate-related extinctions had occurred. The first period they examined was the Eocene Climatic Optimum (53-51 million years ago), during which time the atmosphere's CO2 concentration exceeded 1200 ppm and tropical temperatures were 5-10°C warmer than modern values. Yet far from causing extinctions of the tropical flora (where the data are best), the four researchers report that "all the evidence from low-latitude records indicates that, at least in the plant fossil record, this was one of the most biodiverse intervals of time in the Neotropics." They also note that "ancestors of many of our modern tropical and temperate plants evolved ...when global temperatures and CO2 were much higher than present...indicating that they have much wider ecological tolerances than are predicted based on present-day climates alone." The second period they examined consisted of two rapid-change climatic events in the Holocene -- one at 14,700 years ago and one at 11,600 years ago -- during which times temperatures increased in the mid- to high-latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere by up to 10°C over periods of less than 60 years. During these events, there is evidence from many sites for rapid plant responses to rapid warming. And the authors note that "at no site yet studied, anywhere in the world, is there evidence in the fossil record for large-scale climate-driven extinction during these intervals of rapid warming." On the other hand, they report that extinctions *did* occur due to the *cold* temperatures of the *glacial* epoch, when subtropical species in southern Europe were driven out of their comfort zone. The study of Willis *et al*. also makes use of recent historical data, as in the case of the 3°C rise in temperature at Yosemite Park over the past 100 years. In comparing surveys of mammal fauna conducted near the beginning and end of this period, they detected some changes, but no local extinctions. Thus, they determined that for all of the periods they studied, with either very warm temperatures or very rapid warming, there were no detectable extinctions.

### 1NC – Disease

#### No extinction

Malcolm Gladwell, writer for The New Yorker and best-selling author The New Republic, July 17 and 24, 1995, excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, 1999, p. 31-32

Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adapt a specific strategy but every strategy carries a corresponding cost and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all hut halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability its essential rigidity is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. AIDS is almost invariably lethal because it attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. Viruses are not superhuman. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flue, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms.

### 2NC – Ext: No Impact Warming

#### Adaptation and migration solve

Thompson et al. 9 – Ian, Canadian Forest Service, Brendan Mackey, The Australian National University, The Fenner School of Environment and Society, College of Medicine, Biology and Environment, Steven McNulty, USDA Forest Service, Alex Mosseler, Canadian Forest Service, 2009, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity “Forest Resilience, Biodiversity, and Climate Change” Convention on Biological Diversity

While resilience can be attributed to many levels of organization of biodiversity, the genetic composition of species is the most fundamental. Molecular genet- ic diversity within a species, species diversity within a forested community, and community or ecosystem diversity across a landscape and bioregion represent expressions of biological diversity at different scales. The basis of all expressions of biological diversity is the genotypic variation found in populations. The individuals that comprise populations at each level of ecological organization are subject to natural se- lection and contribute to the adaptive capacity or re- silience of tree species and forest ecosystems (Mull- er-Starck et al. 2005). Diversity at each of these levels has fostered natural (and artificial) regeneration of forest ecosystems and facilitated their adaptation to dramatic climate changes that occurred during the quaternary period (review by: DeHayes et al. 2000); this diversity must be maintained in the face of antici- pated changes from anthropogenic climate warming. Genetic diversity (e.g., additive genetic variance) within a species is important because it is the basis for the natural selection of genotypes within popu- lations and species as they respond or adapt to en- vironmental changes (Fisher 1930, Pitelka 1988, Pease et al. 1989, Burger and Lynch 1995, Burdon and Thrall, 2001, Etterson 2004, Reusch et al. 2005, Schaberg et al. 2008). The potential for evolutionary change has been demonstrated in numerous long- term programmes based on artificial selection (Fal- coner 1989), and genetic strategies for reforestation in the presence of rapid climate change must focus on maintaining species diversity and genetic diversi- ty within species (Ledig and Kitzmiller 1992). In the face of rapid environmental change, it is important to understand that the genetic diversity and adap- tive capacity of forested ecosystems depends largely on in situ genetic variation within each population of a species (Bradshaw 1991). Populations exposed to a rate of environmental change exceeding the rate at which populations can adapt, or disperse, may be doomed to extinction (Lynch and Lande 1993, Burger and Lynch 1995). Genetic diversity deter- mines the range of fundamental eco-physiological tolerances of a species. It governs inter-specific competitive interactions, which, together with dispersal mechanisms, constitute the fundamental de- terminants of potential species responses to change (Pease et al. 1989, Halpin 1997). In the past, plants have responded to dramatic changes in climate both through adaptation and migration (Davis and Shaw 2001). The capacity for long-distance migration of plants by seed dispersal is particularly important in the event of rapid environmental change. Most, and probably all, species are capable of long-distance seed disper- sal, despite morphological dispersal syndromes that would indicate morphological adaptations primarily for short-distance dispersal (Cwyner and MacDon- ald 1986, Higgins et al. 2003). Assessments of mean migration rates found no significant differences be- tween wind and animal dispersed plants (Wilkinson 1997, Higgins et al. 2003). Long-distance migration can also be strongly influenced by habitat suitabil- ity (Higgins and Richardson 1999) suggesting that rapid migration may become more frequent and vis- ible with rapid changes in habitat suitability under scenarios of rapid climate change. The discrepancy between estimated and observed migration rates during re-colonization of northern temperate forests following the retreat of glaciers can be accounted for by the underestimation of long-distance disper- sal rates and events (Brunet and von Oheimb 1998, Clark 1998, Cain et al. 1998, 2000). Nevertheless, concerns persist that potential migration and ad- aptation rates of many tree species may not be able to keep pace with projected global warming (Davis 1989, Huntley 1991, Dyer 1995, Collingham et al. 1996, Malcolm et al. 2002). However, these models refer to fundamental niches and generally ignore the ecological interactions that also govern species dis- tributions.

Bio D loss won’t collapse the environment

Washington Post 97 – August 29, 1997, “Diversity Is Not Enough to Ensure Hardy Ecosystems,” p. A03, lexis

Ecologists have long maintained that diversity is one of nature’s greatest strengths, but new research suggests that diversity alone does not guarantee strong ecosystems. In findings that could intensify the national debate over endangered species and habitat conservation, three new studies suggest that a greater abundance of plant and animal varieties does not always translate to better ecological health. At least equally important, the research found, are the types of species and how they function together. “Having a long list of Latin names isn’t always better than a shorter list of Latin names,” said Stanford University biologist Peter Vitousek, co-author of one of the studies published in the journal Science. Separate experiments in California, Minnesota and Sweden found that diversity often had little bearing on the performance of ecosystems -- at least as measured by the growth and health of native plants. In fact, the communities with the greatest biological richness were often the poorest when it came to productivity and the cycling of nutrients. One study compared plant life on 50 remote islands in northern Sweden that are prone to frequent wildfires from lightning strikes. Scientist David Wardle of Landcare Research in Lincoln, New Zealand, and colleagues at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, found that islands dominated by a few species of plants recovered more quickly than nearby islands with greater biological diversity. Similar findings were reported by University of Minnesota researchers who studied savannah grasses, and by Stanford’s Vitousek and colleague David Hooper, who concluded that functional characteristics of plant species were more important than the number of varieties in determining how ecosystems performed. “In aiming to protect natural ecosystems, we cannot just manage for species variety alone,” the Stanford researchers wrote. British plant ecologist J.P. Grime, in a commentary summarizing the research, said there is not yet “convincing evidence that species diversity and ecosystem function are consistently and causally related.” “It could be argued,” he added, “that the tide is turning against the notion of high biodiversity as a controller of ecosystem function and insurance against ecological collapse.”

## OFAC

#### No Solve

### No impact – every actor has incentives to overstate consequences

**Farley 11**, assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, (Robert, "Over the Horizon: Iran and the Nuclear Paradox," 11-16, [www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10679/over-the-horizon-iran-and-the-nuclear-paradox](http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10679/over-the-horizon-iran-and-the-nuclear-paradox))

But states and policymakers habitually overestimate the impact of nuclear weapons. This happens among both proliferators and anti-proliferators. Would-be proliferators seem to expect that possessing a nuclear weapon will confer “a seat at the table” as well as solve a host of minor and major foreign policy problems. Existing nuclear powers fear that new entrants will act unpredictably, destabilize regions and throw existing diplomatic arrangements into flux. These predictions almost invariably turn out wrong; nuclear weapons consistently fail to undo the existing power relationships of the international system.

The North Korean example is instructive. In spite of the dire warnings about the dangers of a North Korean nuclear weapon, the region has weathered Pyongyang’s nuclear proliferation in altogether sound fashion. Though some might argue that nukes have “enabled” North Korea to engage in a variety of bad behaviors, that was already the case prior to its nuclear test. The crucial deterrent to U.S. or South Korean action continues to be North Korea’s conventional capabilities, as well as the incalculable costs of governing North Korea after a war. Moreover, despite the usual dire predictions of nonproliferation professionals, the North Korean nuclear program has yet to inspire Tokyo or Seoul to follow suit. The DPRK’s program represents a tremendous waste of resources and human capital for a poor state, and it may prove a problem if North Korea endures a messy collapse. Thus far, however, the effects of the arsenal have been minimal.

Israel represents another case in which the benefits of nuclear weapons remain unclear. Although Israel adopted a policy of ambiguity about its nuclear program, most in the region understood that Israel possessed nuclear weapons by the late-1960s. These weapons did not deter Syria or Egypt from launching a large-scale conventional assault in 1973, however. Nor did they help the Israeli Defense Force compel acquiescence in Lebanon in 1982 or 2006. Nuclear weapons have not resolved the Palestinian question, and when it came to removing the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, Israel relied not on its nuclear arsenal but on the United States to do so -- through conventional means -- in 2003. Israeli nukes have thus far failed to intimidate the Iranians into freezing their nuclear program. Moreover, Israel has pursued a defense policy designed around the goal of maintaining superiority at every level of military escalation, from asymmetrical anti-terror efforts to high-intensity conventional combat. Thus, it is unclear whether the nuclear program has even saved Israel any money.

The problem with nukes is that there are strong material and normative pressures against their use, not least because states that use nukes risk incurring nuclear retaliation. Part of the appeal of nuclear weapons is their bluntness, but for foreign policy objectives requiring a scalpel rather than a sledgehammer, they are useless. As a result, states with nuclear neighbors quickly find that they can engage in all manner of harassment and escalation without risking nuclear retaliation. The weapons themselves are often more expensive than the foreign policy objectives that they would be used to attain. Moreover, normative pressures do matter. Even “outlaw” nations recognize that the world views the use of nuclear -- not to mention chemical or biological -- weapons differently than other expressions of force. And almost without exception, even outlaw nations require the goodwill of at least some segments of the international community.

Given all this, it is not at all surprising that many countries eschew nuclear programs, even when they could easily attain nuclear status. Setting aside the legal problems, nuclear programs tend to be expensive, and they provide relatively little in terms of foreign policy return on investment. Brazil, for example, does not need nuclear weapons to exercise influence in Latin America or deter its rivals. Turkey, like Germany, Japan and South Korea, decided a long time ago that the nuclear “problem” could be solved most efficiently through alignment with an existing nuclear power.

Why do policymakers, analysts and journalists so consistently overrate the importance of nuclear weapons? The answer is that everyone has a strong incentive to lie about their importance. The Iranians will lie to the world about the extent of their program and to their people about the fruits of going nuclear. The various U.S. client states in the region will lie to Washington about how terrified they are of a nuclear Iran, warning of the need for “strategic re-evaluation,” while also using the Iranian menace as an excuse for brutality against their own populations. Nonproliferation advocates will lie about the terrors of unrestrained proliferation because they do not want anyone to shift focus to the manageability of a post-nuclear Iran. The United States will lie to everyone in order to reassure its clients and maintain the cohesion of the anti-Iran block.

None of these lies are particularly dishonorable; they represent the normal course of diplomacy. But they are lies nevertheless, and serious analysts of foreign policy and international relations need to be wary of them.

Nonproliferation is a good idea, if only because states should not waste tremendous resources on weapons of limited utility. Nuclear weapons also represent a genuine risk of accidents, especially for states that have not yet developed appropriately robust security precautions. Instability and collapse in nuclear states has been harrowing in the past and will undoubtedly be harrowing in the future. All of these threats should be taken seriously by policymakers. Unfortunately, as long as deception remains the rule in the practice of nuclear diplomacy, exaggerated alarmism will substitute for a realistic appraisal of the policy landscape.

#### Religiously condoned

Kapur ‘8

(S. Paul; Associate professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia. pg. 32)

Before a terrorist group can attempt to use nuclear weapons, it must meet two basic requirements. First, the group must decide that it wishes to engage in nuclear terrorism. Analysts and policy makers often assume that terrorist groups necessarily want to do so (Carter 2004; U.S. Government 2002). However, **it is not clear that terrorist organizations would necessarily covet nuclear devices**. **Although analysts often characterize terrorism as an irrational activity** (Laqeuer I999: 4-5), **extensive empirical evidence indicates that terrorist groups in fact be­have rationally**, adopting strategies designed to achieve particular ends (Crenshaw I995: 4; Pape 2003: 344). Thus whether terrorists would use nuclear weapons is contingent on whether doing so is likely to further their goals. Under what circumstances could nuclear weapons fail to promote terrorists' goals? **For certain types of terrorist objectives, nuclear weapons could be too de­structive.** **Large-scale devastation could negatively influence audiences important to the terrorist groups.** **Terrorists often rely on populations sympathetic to their cause for political, financial, and military support.** **The horrific destruction of a nuclear explosion could alienate segments of this audience**. **People who otherwise would sympathize with the terrorists may conclude that in using a nuclear device terrorists had gone too far and were no longer deserving of support**. The catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons could also damage or destroy the very thing that the terrorist group most values. For example, **if a terrorist orga­nization were struggling with another group for control of their common home­land, the use of nuclear weapons against the enemy group would devastate the terrorists' own home territory.** Using nuclear weapons would be extremely counter­productive for the terrorists in this scenario.

#### Probability is 1 in 3 billion

Mueller 1/1/2008 [John Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science Department of Political Science, Ohio State University. THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD Prepared for presentation at the Program on International Security Policy, University of Chicago, January 15, 2008

Evaluating the likelihood Even if there is some desire for the bomb by terrorists (something assessed more fully below), fulfillment of that desire is obviously another matter. Even alarmists Bunn and Wier contend that the atomic terrorists' task "would clearly be among the most difficult types of attack to carry out" or "one of the most difficult missions a terrorist group could hope to try" (2006, 133-34, 147). But, stresses George Tenet, a terrorist atomic bomb is "possible" or "not beyond the realm of possibility" (Tenet and Harlow 2007, 266, 279). It might be useful to take a stab at estimating just how "difficult" or "not impossible" their task is, or how distant the "realm of possibility" might be. After all, lots of things are "not impossible." As I recall, there is a James Bond movie out there someplace in which Our Hero leaps from a low-flying plane or helicopter and lands unruffled in the back seat of a speeding convertible next to a bemused blonde. Although this impressive feat is "not impossible," it may not have ever been accomplished--or perhaps more importantly, ever attempted--in real life. Or it is entirely "not impossible" that a colliding meteor or comet could destroy the earth, that Vladimir Putin or the British could decide one morning to launch a few nuclear weapons at Massachusetts, George Bush could decide to bomb Hollywood, that an underwater volcano could erupt to cause a civilization-ending tidal wave, or that Osama bin Laden could convert to Judaism, declare himself to be the Messiah, and fly in a gaggle of mafioso hit men from Rome to have himself publicly crucified.20 In all this, Brodie's cautionary comment in the 1970s about the imaginative alarmists in the defense community holds as well for those in today's terrorism community, both of which are inhabited by people of a wide range of skills and sometimes of considerable imagination. All sorts of notions and propositions are churned out, and often presented for consideration with the prefatory works: "It is conceivable that..." Such words establish their own truth, for the fact that someone has conceived of whatever proposition follows is enough to establish that it is conceivable. Whether it is worth a second thought, however, is another matter (1978, 83). At any rate, experience thus far cannot be too encouraging to the would-be atomic terrorist. One group that tried, in the early 1990s, to pull off the deed was the Japanese apocalyptic group, Aum Shinrikyo. Unlike al-Qaeda, it was not under siege, and it had money, expertise, a remote and secluded haven in which to set up shop, even a private uranium mine. But it made dozens of mistakes in judgment, planning, and execution (Linzer 2004). Chagrined, it turned to biological weapons which, as it happened, didn't work either, and finally to chemical ones, resulting eventually in a somewhat botched release of sarin gas in a Tokyo subway that managed to kill a total of 12 people. Appraising the barriers. As noted earlier, most discussions of atomic terrorism deal rather piecemeal with the subject--focusing separately on individual tasks such as procuring HEU or assembling a device or transporting it. But, as the Gilmore Commission, a special advisory panel to the President and Congress, stresses, building a nuclear device capable of producing mass destruction presents "Herculean challenges" and requires that a whole series of steps be accomplished. The process requires obtaining enough fissile material, designing a weapon "that will bring that mass together in a tiny fraction of a second, before the heat from early fission blows the material apart," and figuring out some way to deliver the thing. And it emphasizes that these merely constitute "the minimum requirements." If each is not fully met, the result is not simply a less powerful weapon, but one that can't produce any significant nuclear yield at all or can't be delivered (Gilmore 1999, 31, emphasis in the original). Following this perspective, an approach that seems appropriate is to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome by a terrorist group in order to carry out the task of producing, transporting, and then successfully detonating Allison's "large, cumbersome, unsafe, unreliable, unpredictable, and inefficient" improvised nuclear device. Table 1 attempts to do this, and it arrays some 20 of these--all of which must be surmounted by the atomic aspirant. Actually, it would be quite possible to come up with a longer list: in the interests of keeping the catalogue of hurdles down to a reasonable number, some of the entries are actually collections of tasks and could be divided into two or three or more. For example, number 5 on the list requires that heisted highly-enriched uranium be neither a scam nor part of a sting nor of inadequate quality due to insider incompetence; but this hurdle could as readily be rendered as three separate ones. In assembling the list, I sought to make the various barriers independent, or effectively independent, from each other, although they are, of course, related in the sense that they are sequential. However, while the terrorists must locate an inadequately-secured supply of HEU to even begin the project, this discovery will have little bearing on whether they will be successful at securing an adequate quantity of the material, even though, obviously, they can't do the second task before accomplishing the first. Similarly, assembling and supplying an adequately equipped machine shop is effectively an independent task from the job of recruiting a team of scientists and technicians to work within it. Moreover, members of this group must display two qualities that, although combined in hurdle 9, are essentially independent of each other: they must be both technically skilled and absolutely loyal to the project. Assessing the probabilities. In seeking to carry out their task, would-be atomic terrorists effectively must go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do so, they are likely to find their prospects daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even dispiriting. To bias the case in their favor, one might begin by assuming that they have a fighting chance of 50 percent of overcoming each of these obstacles even though for many barriers, probably almost all, the odds against them are much worse than that. Even with that generous bias, the chances they could successfully pull off the mission come out to be worse than one in a million, specifically they are one in 1,048,567. Indeed, the odds of surmounting even seven of the twenty hurdles at that unrealistically, even absurdly, high presumptive success rate is considerably less than one in a hundred. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds they will be able to pull off the deed drop to **one in well over three billion**--specifically 3,486,784,401. What they would be at the (entirely realistic) level one in ten boggles the mind. One could also make specific estimates for each of the hurdles, but the cumulative probability statistics are likely to come out pretty much the same--or even smaller. For example there may be a few barriers, such as number 13, where one might plausibly conclude the terrorists' chances are better than 50/50. However, there are many in which the likelihood of success is almost certainly going to be exceedingly small--for example, numbers 4, 5, 9, and 12, and, increasingly, the (obviously) crucial number 1. Those would be the odds for a single attempt by a single group, and there could be multiple attempts by multiple groups, of course. Although Allison considers al-Qaeda to be "the most probable perpetrator" on the nuclear front (2004, 29), he is also concerned about the potential atomic exploits of other organizations such as Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah, Chechen gangsters, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and various doomsday cults (2004, 29-42).21 Putting aside the observation that few, if any, of these appear to have interest in hitting the United States except for al-Qaeda (to be discussed more fully below), the odds would remain long even with multiple attempts. If there were a hundred determined efforts over a period of time, the chance at least one of these would be successful comes in at less than one one-hundredth of one percent at the one chance in two level. At the far more realistic level of one chance in three it would be about one in 50 million. If there were 1000 dedicated attempts, presumably over several decades, the chance of success would be less than one percent at the 50/50 level and about one in 50,000 at the one in three level.22

## Relat

#### Zero risk of Latin America arms race escalating

Munks 9 – Americas Analyst, IHS Jane's (Robert Munks, “Could war erupt in arms-spree LatAm?” BBC, September 15 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8256686.stm) MR

But in practice, the risk of war breaking out is still negligible, given the likelihood of massive dissuasive pressure from both the US and Brazil. For the moment, at least, arms acquisitions by Mr Chavez continue to be a mix of both nationalistic pride and sabre-rattling. Economic suicide Elsewhere on the continent, fears of an arms race between neighbouring Chile and Peru - which have contested a maritime boundary since a war in 1879 - resurface periodically. Yet here again, the actual threat is minimal. Peru knows that it would be economic suicide to try to match Chile's vastly superior armed forces. Sporadic outbursts of nationalist rhetoric are good for letting off steam, but do not indicate genuine military competition. Even military minnows Paraguay and Bolivia have recently been mentioned in an "arms race" context. Recent Bolivian military purchases - including helicopters from Russia - briefly raised over-exaggerated fears in Paraguay of a retaliatory re-run of the bloody 1932-1935 Chaco War, in which Bolivia lost large swathes of territory. In reality, however, the appetite for confrontation is non-existent.

# 1NR

Syria authorization has momentum now – freshman lawmakers

Shane Goldmacher, congressional correspondent for the National Journal, 8/29 [“In Congress, It's the Fresher Faces Pushing for Vote on Syria Strike,” National Journal, http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/in-congress-it-s-the-fresher-faces-pushing-for-vote-on-syria-strike-20130829]

The push for a congressional vote ahead of any military strike in Syria is being spearheaded largely by lawmakers who were not in Congress during the run-up to the war in Iraq.¶ As of Wednesday, Republican Rep. Scott Rigell had collected the signatures of 140 House members demanding that President Obama call Congress back into session to vote before launching an offensive in Syria. And roughly three-quarters of the signers, including Rigell himself, a former Marine elected in 2010 who represents the military-heavy area around Norfolk, Va., came to Congress after the Iraq war had begun. More still had arrived after the Iraq war resolution passed in late 2002.¶ The same is also true in the Senate, where first-term senators have been among the loudest voices pushing for explicit congressional authorization.¶ Much of the Congress has turned over since the early 2003 invasion of Iraq, with three wave elections in 2006, 2008, and 2010 sweeping away lawmakers and redistricting eliminating the seats of still others in 2012.¶ Only 32 current senators served in 2002 during the fall vote on the Iraq war resolution and only 38 were there when American troops launched the invasion in the spring of 2003. In the House, roughly 40 percent of current members -- 172 of them -- were sworn in at the time of the 2003 invasion.¶ That means that, for many in the current Congress, this is the first time they've experienced the drumbeats of war, outside of the strikes that Obama authorized against Libya earlier in his presidency. And instead of marching in line, the fresh faces are among those most loudly demanding a public debate.¶ "The U.S. should not take military action without congressional authorization," Sen. Chris Murphy, D-Conn., said this week.¶ "When and if President Obama makes a decision on Syria, he must immediately call a special session of Congress and persuade the American people that what he proposes is critical to the defense of our nation," Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas, added.¶ Sen. Tim Kaine, D-Va., said Thursday on CNN's New Day that "getting congressional approval is in my view constitutionally required. "¶ Kaine, Murphy, and Cruz are all Senate freshmen.¶ When Obama was running for president, he embraced the power of Congress to authorize military strikes, telling The Boston Globe, "The president does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation."

Authorization has support now – but political calculations must go right

AFP 9/3 [“Republican House speaker to back Obama on Syria strikes,” http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2013/09/republican-house-speaker-to-back-obama-on-syria-strikes/]

WASHINGTON, Sep 3 – US Republican House Speaker John Boehner on Tuesday said he would support President Barack Obama’s call for military strikes against Syria, in a potentially significant political move.¶ Boehner emerged from talks with Obama at the White House saying the United States must respond to the use of chemical weapons, adding: “I am going to support the president’s call for action.”¶ “This is something that the United States as a country needs to do,” Boehner said, adding that he believed his colleagues should also support Obama’s request for authorization to use military force.¶ “We have enemies around the world that need to understand we are not going to tolerate this type of behaviour,” Boehner told reporters.¶ “We also have allies around the world and allies in the region who also need to know America will be there and stand up when necessary.”¶ Obama shocked the world on Saturday when he decided to ask Congress for support on military strikes which had then seemed imminent, in a move which represented a significant political gamble.

Will get the votes – corralling now

Ted Barrett, CNN Senior Congressional Producer, 9/6 [“Reid: Getting 60 votes for Syria resolution is 'a work in progress',” http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2013/09/06/reid-getting-60-votes-for-syria-resolution-is-a-work-in-progress/]

Washington (CNN) – Getting at least 60 U.S. senators to support a military authorization against Syria is "a work in progress," Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid acknowledged Friday while expressing optimism he would be able to reach that goa**l**.¶ "I think we're going to get to 60 votes. You know it's a work in progress," Reid told reporters as he stepped off the Senate floor after formally filing the measure and readying it for expected votes next week.¶ Supporters of attacking Syria for its alleged use of chemical weapons against Syrian civilians are trying to secure backing from at least 60 senators because they believe they will need to overcome a filibuster from opponents. Reid declined to answer specific questions about vote counts and floor strategy for the measure, which appears to have an uphill climb to passage.¶ On Monday, Reid is expected to take the first steps to overcome an anticipated filibuster over whether to formally begin debate on the resolution. That would set up a key test vote on that question Wednesday.¶ Reid said the many classified administration briefings held this week have helped lawmakers better understand the case against the Syrian government.¶ He defended the president's desire to strike Syria, saying it is critical the U.S. stand up for an international treaty adopted after World War I that banned the use of the horrible weapons.¶ "To have this man use chemical weapons, as is pretty clear now, more than once – last time killing 1,439 people, including hundreds of children – if this doesn't call for a response I don't know what does," Reid said.

Strikes will be approved – momentum from bipartisan committee

Stephen Dinan is national political correspondent for The Washington Times, 9/4 [“Syria war plan advances in Senate, pushes Obama to help rebels,” WT, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/4/syria-war-plan-advances-in-senate-pushes-obama-for/?utm\_source=RSS\_Feed&utm\_medium=RSS]

Senators wrote a war plan Wednesday for retaliatory military strikes against Syria, narrowly winning committee approval for a bipartisan blueprint that would grant President Obama authority to bomb the Assad regime’s chemical weapons facilities.¶ The resolution limits Mr. Obama by giving him 90 days to act, but also goes beyond what he wanted by pushing him to take steps to help the rebels seeking to oust Syrian President Bashar Assad — language that was added Wednesday to win over the support of hawkish Republicans.¶ Still, the White House said it accepted the resolution as a key show of support.¶ “We believe America is stronger when the president and Congress work together,” White House press secretary Jay Carney said after the vote, even though the resolution is significantly different from what Mr. Obama proposed during the weekend.

#### Hirsh is just an internet “correspondent” complaining about the term political capital-

1. **There’s still an agenda crowd out link- concedes tradeoffs happen - especially if a policy is unpopular and out of sync with the country’s mood—ie the plan**
2. **Despite the ev’s hype, it concedes it is a real thing**
3. **Concludes Obama messaging on immigration is a relevant factor for GOP support**

#### Wins don’t spill over- bruising effort doesn’t generate capital-

Michael Hirsch, Daily Beast, 1-19-2010 <http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/01/19/the-politics-of-hubris.html>

There was nothing new about this, of course. It falls into the age-old annals of hubris, the same excess of pride that got Achilles and Agamemnon in trouble with the gods. Obama apparently did buy into the idea that he was a Man of Destiny and, being one, possessed bottomless supplies of political capital. But he really had no more political capital than any first-year president, and he was straining his reserves just dealing with the stimulus and financial reform, much less fixing Afghanistan.¶ I first became worried about this bridge-too-far problem last year while covering financial reform on the Hill, when various congressional staffers told me their bosses didn't really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room—and from their brains, the aides said. Obama and his team seemed barely focused on transforming the financial system—except now, belatedly—and left a lot of the infighting to regulators like Gary Gensler, the chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Obama had spoken admiringly of Ronald Reagan as a transformational president. And yet at what would seem to be a similar historical inflection point—what should have been the end of Reaganite free-market fundamentalism and a laserlike scourging of Wall Street—Obama seemed to put this once-in-a-lifetime task on a back burner.¶ It is only now, a year later, when he has a terrific fight on his hands over health care, that Obama is talking about seriously breaking up the structure of Wall Street. The big-bank lobby will dig in big time of course, and seek to buy everyone it can on Capitol Hill, which means that the president will need even more political capital that he no longer has.¶ Just as bad, when the president did do health care—whatever version of it squeaks through now—he seemed to be getting such a meager result for so bruising an effort that it will be a long time before anyone has the stomach to set it right legislatively.

#### PC finite- legislative wins don’t spillover –empirics, true for Obama, too polarized- newest ev

Todd **Eberly** is coordinator of Public Policy Studies and assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at St. Mary's College of Maryland. His email is teeberly@smcm.edu. This article is excerpted from his book, co-authored with Steven Schier, "American Government and Popular Discontent: Stability without Success," to published later this year by Routledge Press., **1-21**-2013 <http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-21/news/bs-ed-political-capital-20130121_1_political-system-party-support-public-opinion/2>

As Barack Obama prepares to be sworn in for the second time as president of the United States, he faces the stark reality that little of what he hopes to accomplish in a second term will likely come to pass. Mr. Obama occupies an office that many assume to be all powerful, but like so many of his recent predecessors, the president knows better. He faces a political capital problem and a power trap.¶ In the post-1960s American political system, presidents have found the exercise of effective leadership a difficult task. To lead well, a president needs support — or at least permission — from federal courts and Congress; steady allegiance from public opinion and fellow partisans in the electorate; backing from powerful, entrenched interest groups; and accordance with contemporary public opinion about the proper size and scope of government. This is a long list of requirements. If presidents fail to satisfy these requirements, they face the prospect of inadequate political support or political capital to back their power assertions.¶ What was so crucial about the 1960s? We can trace so much of what defines contemporary politics to trends that emerged then. Americans' confidence in government began a precipitous decline as the tumult and tragedies of the 1960s gave way to the scandals and economic uncertainties of the 1970s. Long-standing party coalitions began to fray as the New Deal coalition, which had elected Franklin Roosevelt to four terms and made Democrats the indisputable majority party, faded into history. The election of Richard Nixon in 1968 marked the beginning of an unprecedented era of divided government. Finally, the two parties began ideologically divergent journeys that resulted in intense polarization in Congress, diminishing the possibility of bipartisan compromise. These changes, combined with the growing influence of money and interest groups and the steady "thickening" of the federal bureaucracy, introduced significant challenges to presidential leadership.¶ Political capital can best be understood as a combination of the president's party support in Congress, public approval of his job performance, and the president's electoral victory margin. The components of political capital are central to the fate of presidencies. It is difficult to claim warrants for leadership in an era when job approval, congressional support and partisan affiliation provide less backing for a president than in times past. In recent years, presidents' political capital has shrunk while their power assertions have grown, making the president a volatile player in the national political system.¶ Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush joined the small ranks of incumbents defeated while seeking a second term. Ronald Reagan was elected in two landslides, yet his most successful year for domestic policy was his first year in office. Bill Clinton was twice elected by a comfortable margin, but with less than majority support, and despite a strong economy during his second term, his greatest legislative successes came during his first year with the passage of a controversial but crucial budget bill, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the North American Free Trade Agreement. George W. Bush won election in 2000 having lost the popular vote, and though his impact on national security policy after the Sept. 11 attacks was far reaching, his greatest domestic policy successes came during 2001. Ambitious plans for Social Security reform, following his narrow re-election in 2004, went nowhere.¶ Faced with obstacles to successful leadership, recent presidents have come to rely more on their formal powers. The number of important executive orders has increased significantly since the 1960s, as have the issuance of presidential signing statements. Both are used by presidents in an attempt to shape and direct policy on their terms. Presidents have had to rely more on recess appointments as well, appointing individuals to important positions during a congressional recess (even a weekend recess) to avoid delays and obstruction often encountered in the Senate. Such power assertions typically elicit close media scrutiny and often further erode political capital.¶ Barack Obama's election in 2008 seemed to signal a change. Mr. Obama's popular vote majority was the largest for any president since 1988, and he was the first Democrat to clear the 50 percent mark since Lyndon Johnson. The president initially enjoyed strong public approval and, with a Democratic Congress, was able to produce an impressive string of legislative accomplishments during his first year and early into his second, capped by enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. But with each legislative battle and success, his political capital waned. His impressive successes with Congress in 2009 and 2010 were accompanied by a shift in the public mood against him, evident in the rise of the tea party movement, the collapse in his approval rating, and the large GOP gains in the 2010 elections, which brought a return to divided government.¶ By mid-2011, Mr. Obama's job approval had slipped well below its initial levels, and Congress was proving increasingly intransigent. In the face of declining public support and rising congressional opposition, Mr. Obama, like his predecessors, looked to the energetic use of executive power. In 2012, the president relied on executive discretion and legal ambiguity to allow homeowners to more easily refinance federally backed mortgages, to help veterans find employment and to make it easier for college graduates to consolidate federal student loan debt. He issued several executive orders effecting change in the nation's enforcement of existing immigration laws. He used an executive order to authorize the Department of Education to grant states waivers from the requirements of the No Child Left Behind Act — though the enacting legislation makes no accommodation for such waivers. Contrary to the outcry from partisan opponents, Mr. Obama's actions were hardly unprecedented or imperial. Rather, they represented a rather typical power assertion from a contemporary president.¶ Many looked to the 2012 election as a means to break present trends. But Barack Obama's narrow re-election victory, coupled with the re-election of a somewhat-diminished Republican majority House and Democratic majority Senate, hardly signals a grand resurgence of his political capital. The president's recent issuance of multiple executive orders to deal with the issue of gun violence is further evidence of his power trap. Faced with the likelihood of legislative defeat in Congress, the president must rely on claims of unilateral power. But such claims are not without limit or cost and will likely further erode his political capital.¶ Only by solving the problem of political capital is a president likely to avoid a power trap. Presidents in recent years have been unable to prevent their political capital from eroding. When it did, their power assertions often got them into further political trouble. Through leveraging public support, presidents have at times been able to overcome contemporary leadership challenges by adopting as their own issues that the public already supports. Bill Clinton's centrist "triangulation" and George W. Bush's careful issue selection early in his presidency allowed them to secure important policy changes — in Mr. Clinton's case, welfare reform and budget balance, in Mr. Bush's tax cuts and education reform — that at the time received popular approval.¶ However, short-term legislative strategies may win policy success for a president but do not serve as an antidote to declining political capital over time, as the difficult final years of both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies demonstrate. None of Barack Obama's recent predecessors solved the political capital problem or avoided the power trap. It is the central political challenge confronted by modern presidents and one that will likely weigh heavily on the current president's mind today as he takes his second oath of office.

#### Uniquely true of second term presidents

Bert Atkinson Jr., Independent Review Journal, 3-12-2031 <http://www.ijreview.com/2013/03/41467-love-affair-ending-obamas-political-capital-declining/>

The second term is notoriously tough for two term candidates. Clinton had a little snafu on his …hands during his second term that led to impeachment, and George W. Bush was demonized time and time again.¶ Now, it could be that Barack Obama is facing a similar fate…¶ If President Barack Obama had piled up political capital with his impressive re-election, it’s largely gone.¶ His approval rating has dropped to the lowest level in more than a year, with more voters now turning thumbs down on his performance than thumbs up, according to a new McClatchy-Marist poll. The measure of how much people like him also has dropped.¶ He’s still vastly more popular than Congress, particularly congressional Republicans. But in the biggest political clash of the year – over the federal budget and how to curb deficits – voters split 44 percent to 42 percent between preferring Congress or Obama.¶ What? There’s no Mitt Romney to be held up against?¶ Blame Congressional Republicans all you want, but in 50 years when children are reading American history books about the infamous fiscal cliff/debt ceiling/sequestration debacles of 2013, they will certainly not remember names like Mitch McConnell or John Boehner; they will absolutely read about President Obama and how all of this happened under his lack of leadership.¶ “This may be the downside of him coming out of the box stronger in the second term,” Miringoff said. “People are now looking for him to lead us out of this stalemate, provide more leadership. People see him as a strong figure and in the driver’s seat. During the election, it was him versus Romney. Now it’s him versus people’s expectations for the country.”¶ Expectations: Obama will have a tough time meeting them. I know the mainstream media has been in the tank for Obama for a half-decade now, but they still answer to ratings. If I had to take a guess, I would say that there will be more negative news stemming from the growing discontent of his ability to follow through on his promises. I’m not saying we’re about to see MSNBC go all Fox News on the guy, but the broken promises and evolutions and flip-flops can only go on for so long before people start catching on. Let’s just say that if Obama is still sending a thrill up your leg at this point, you’ve got some issues. (Looking at you, Chris Matthews.)

#### Best studies go neg – capital is key

Beckmann and McGann, UC Irvine political science professors, 8

(Matthew N. and Anthony J., Reader in Government at the University of Essex, Journal of Theoretical Politics 20(2):201, DOI: 10.1177/0951629807085818, “Navigating the Legislative Divide: Polarization, Presidents, and Policymaking in the United States,” <http://jtp.sagepub.com>)

Here we propose a theory that casts some early rays of light onto the policy consequences of polarization in Congress. Building from a simple theoretical model in which the president seeks to promote his preferred policies in the Senate (see Snyder, 1991; Groseclose, 1996), we assess differences in the chamber’s preference distribution – from normal to unanimous to bimodal – as well as the ‘political capital’ at the president’s disposal.2 Results show that absent the president, ideological polarization makes amassing the votes needed to beat the status quo difficult, so gridlock frequently prevails. The same is true when the president lacks political capital to spend. However, when endowed with abundant capital, facing a polarized legislature enables presidents to pass policies closer to their ideal than would have been possible in an assembly characterized by greater ideological homogeneity. Hence the familiar prediction of blanket ‘gridlock’ is overblown. Instead, comparative statics show that the consequences of ideological polarization in Congress are conditional: they depend on the nature of the preference distribution, the involvement of the president, and the political capi- tal at his disposal.

#### Political capital is real and effective – specifically this Congress

Roarty, National Journal politics writer, 2-21-13

[Alex, 2-21-13, The Atlantic, “There's Reason to Be Optimistic About Congress—Seriously,” <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/02/theres-reason-to-be-optimistic-about-congress-seriously/273393/>, accessed 7-9-13, MSG]

Nevertheless, this is a new congressional session, and Boren's pessimism might possibly be proved wrong. For the first time in a decade, if not longer, conditions are aligned for bipartisan deal-making, raising hopes that Congress might actually do something and satisfy the wishes of millions of Americans hungry for action. "I am pleased with the signs I see in Congress today to try to make deals," said Lee Hamilton, who was a veteran Democratic House member from Indiana. "There are threads of it -- it's not a fabric yet -- but there are threads, and that's encouraging."

In today's context, defining success is important -- and requires a healthy dose of both skepticism and pragmatism. There's little hope that this Congress can reverse the -- exacerbated by, among other things, powerful special interests and partisan media -- that has gripped Washington. The forces that drove Rep. Boren out of Congress remain potent, and the legislative atmosphere on Capitol Hill is still toxic.

Instead of a long-term course correction, the question is whether Republican leaders in the House, President Obama, and Senate Democrats can facilitate a reprieve -- if only to show the public that the institution is still functional. Cutting a deal with the broad backing of both parties isn't a question so much of relieving those pressures as of learning to pass laws in spite of them.

Favorable Conditions

The makeup of the 113th Congress and the occupant of the White House make conditions riper for bipartisan legislation than at any time since President George W. Bush's first years in office. Since then, Washington has been in the grip of one of two dynamics: Either one party has held Congress and the presidency, or one party, possessing limited power, has had little interest in passing consequential legislation.

The latter was the case last session, when Republicans controlled only the House. In most cases, they used this chamber to approve legislation, such as Rep. Paul Ryan's eponymous budget, that helped define the party's agenda but had no chance of gaining approval in the Senate (much less withstanding a veto from the White House). They were trying to wait out a president whom they believed would be sent packing in 2013.

Democrats were in a similar position from 2007 to 2009, when they controlled Congress but wanted to wait out Bush's tenure. The lack of bipartisanship, of course, didn't prevent major legislation from becoming law over the past 10 years. But when Democrats controlled Washington and passed the Affordable Care Act in 2010, or similarly empowered Republicans approved Medicare Part D in 2003, they didn't need the backing of the other party -- and by and large didn't get it.

This session is different. Neither party has unilateral control, and yet there is an appetite, in the first year of Obama's second term, to make a serious attempt to legislate. The last time Capitol Hill saw something similar came in 2001 and 2002. Republicans suddenly lost the Senate when Sen. Jim Jeffords of Vermont defected from the GOP in the early summer, but Congress still overwhelmingly approved the No Child Left Behind Act months later (although the first round of Bush's tax cuts passed with only a dozen or so Democrats on board in each chamber). Later, the parties worked together to approve a slew of national security issues after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

But drawing comparisons to that period is difficult because of 9/11; and, besides, most of Bush's term is hardly associated with bipartisan comity. The better parallel -- and the experience current optimists point to -- is 1996 and 1997, which bridges the end of President Clinton's first term and the beginning of his second. That two-year span saw agreements on a series of important issues, ranging from two big-ticket items (welfare reform and a balanced-budget agreement) to lesser-known achievements (such as raising the minimum wage).

The similarity between that period and now extends beyond the split control of government. Only a year earlier, Republicans had ridden the "revolution" of 1994 into control of Congress, when they promised to push their agenda whether Clinton approved or not. But the party ultimately dealt with political setbacks, none more damaging than the government shutdown of 1996. The public blamed Republicans, and afterward Clinton never again trailed GOP presidential nominee Bob Dole (who was Senate majority leader at the time of the shutdown) in a head-to-head matchup, according to preelection polls.

Boehner's Challenge

Public opinion might once again be pulling against Republicans, burnt as they were by Obama's reelection and their unexpected losses in the Senate. In a January poll by The Wall Street Journal and NBC News, 49 percent of adults disapproved of the GOP -- and only 26 percent approved. It was the worst rating for Republicans since 2008. Just as the Republicans in Clinton's time decided their political survival depended on coming to the table, the GOP of today might do the same. "Republicans overplayed the government shutdown, and President Clinton won that battle," said Dan Glickman, a former House member who was Clinton's Agriculture secretary. "And, with that, he effectively used the bully pulpit to control the agenda. He gave a lot of cover for people to vote for him. It's not the only factor, but members of Congress are much [more] likely to support a president when the people at home are inclined to support the president."

How much Obama's broad popularity matters to most GOP House members is debatable. With many of the president's supporters packed into heavily Democratic urban districts, most Republicans represent safely red districts. (In November, Mitt Romney won 227 congressional districts, a majority, despite losing by 4 percentage points in the national vote.)

But Obama's standing could weigh more heavily on House Speaker John Boehner and Majority Leader Eric Cantor than on their followers; Cantor has recently attempted to rebrand the party with a softer image. While their charges' interests are more parochial, they have the national party's image to worry about. Popular opinion could prod the two leaders to reach agreements with Obama, especially on emotional issues such as gun control and immigration. Or, at the very least, public pressure could work to ease the disagreements that make even basic government action difficult -- a factor that might have been at work when House Republicans engineered a three-month delay of the debt ceiling. "They're hearing the message outside the Beltway that 'we elected you people to make things work,'" said John Breaux, the former longtime Democratic senator from Louisiana.

The onus falls particularly hard on Boehner, whose struggles to control his conference are well documented. More than any other player in Washington, he will determine whether anything gets done this year. How he decides to proceed could rest on how frequently he's willing to leave conservative colleagues out in the cold and, consequently, how far he's willing to risk his speakership.

The good of the party, and not his seat of power, propelled Boehner's decision to bring the superstorm Sandy relief bill to a vote earlier this year, when it passed with just a minority of support from Republicans. That combination -- Democrats and the moderate wing of the House GOP -- is the pathway to enacting a sweeping set of bipartisan agreements.

A week after the storm vote, a large bipartisan majority passed a three-month extension of the debt ceiling. "It is hard to see this Congress being viewed as a bipartisan one, but we have seen a glimmer of light on the recent bipartisan vote to extend the debt ceiling," said Ron Bonjean, a onetime aide to the Republican leadership.

Obama's Duty

Maintaining that momentum in the House won't be easy, and it could require Obama's personal leadership. Getting Boehner to take such a perilous route could depend in large part on successful cajoling from the president. And on this subject -- the relationships among Washington's top leaders -- discussion of a deal being cut becomes sharply pessimistic.